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INTRODUCTION 
Should a child be allowed two legal parents only if born into a marriage?  
For children of heterosexual parents, the answer, today, is definitively 
“no.”  Constitutional protection for parental rights does not permit the ties 
between an unwed father and his child to be severed simply because he is 
not married to the child’s mother.  But the answer is often different for the 
child of a lesbian mother.  In a recent opinion, Debra H. v. Janice R., the 
New York Court of Appeals ruled that a lesbian co-parent—a woman who 
had participated in the conception, birth, and early rearing of her partner’s 
biological child—was the child’s second legal parent, but only because the 
two women had entered into a civil union during the pregnancy.1  Her 
functional participation as a co-parent was deemed irrelevant; it was not a 
basis on which parentage could be assigned.2  Legal parentage was derived, 
                                                          
* Professor & Faculty Research Fellow, Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra 
University.  My thanks to Bryn Ostrager for research assistance and to Nancy Polikoff 
for convening this thought-provoking and timely conference. 
 1. Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 195-96 (N.Y. 2010). 
 2. Id. at 188. 
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instead, from the marital status of the child’s biological mother.3  This 
symposium was convened to consider the implications of this “new 
illegitimacy”—a regime in which the rights and welfare of the children of 
lesbians are dependent on the marital status of their parents, reminiscent of 
an almost forgotten era in which the same was widely true for all children. 
The law governing lesbian co-parentage is complicated and varies a 
great deal by jurisdiction.  In some states, the lesbian co-parent is a legal 
stranger to the child of her partner regardless of any steps taken to establish 
a parent-child relationship.  In others, she can gain full “legal parent” status 
by virtue of a so-called second-parent adoption.  In some, even without the 
benefit of adoption, she can be recognized as a quasi- or de facto parent, 
with varying and sometimes uncertain rights vis-à-vis her partner’s child, 
based on the functional relationship between them.  The authorization of 
same-sex marriage and marriage-equivalent statuses in several states has 
created a fourth possibility: parentage based on marital status.  In some 
states, a lesbian co-parent can gain legal parent status by virtue of being 
married to, or having a civil union with, a child’s biological mother.  She is 
a legal parent of children born to her spouse or civil union partner in the 
same way a husband is often considered the legal father of children born to 
his wife during their marriage, regardless of his genetic tie to them. 
Although this last category is made possible by the success of the gay 
marriage movement—same-sex couples now can marry or obtain some 
equivalent status in more than a quarter of the states—the connection 
between parentage and marital status can be deployed to restrict, as well as 
to expand, the rights of non-biological mothers to gain recognition as legal 
parents.  Can the non-biological mother only gain legal parentage status 
through formal legal ties like marriage or adoption, rather than based on the 
existence of functional parent-child relationships or the intent of the parties 
at the time of conception or birth to act as co-parents?  That was the 
holding in Debra H., which is perhaps reflective of a disturbing broader 
trend. 
This development is ironic not only because it reflects a dramatic 
turnaround in the acceptance of same-sex marriage—something once 
verboten is now an essential gateway to other rights—but also because it 
contravenes a longstanding trend in law to disentangle legitimacy and 
parentage.  While unwed fathers were once not considered fathers at all 
simply because they were not married to the mother of their children, today 
they can gain legal parent status regardless of marital status.  Marriage can 
provide a shortcut for men—or their children—to establish a legal parent-
child relationship; but, under modern constitutional principles, marriage 
                                                          
 3. Id. at 195-96. 
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cannot be the exclusive mechanism by which parentage can be obtained.  
For the most part, in this context, the question “who is a parent” is divorced 
from the question of whether the adults have a formal legal relationship 
with one another. 
This Article will argue that the entanglement of legitimacy and parentage 
for children of lesbian co-parents is not only bad for the affected adults and 
children, but also counter to the more general and sensible trend in 
parentage law.  The general trend is to treat a child’s legitimacy—whether 
her parents are married?—and her parentage—who are her legal parents?—
as entirely separate questions.  Developments in the law of unwed 
fatherhood best exemplify this trend and reflect sound reasoning about the 
best way to serve the needs of children and the adults who raise them. 
This Article will proceed in three parts.  First, it will consider the opinion 
in Debra H. and the connection it draws between legitimacy and parentage.  
This Section will also consider the general legal landscape for lesbian co-
mothers—in what ways can they establish legal parentage in different 
jurisdictions?  Second, it will examine the law of unwed fatherhood to trace 
the trend towards disentangling questions of legitimacy and parentage.  
Third, it will consider how best to conceptualize the rights of unmarried, 
lesbian co-parents. 
I.  DEBRA H. AND THE LAW OF PARENTAGE FOR LESBIAN CO-MOTHERS 
The New York Court of Appeals’ ruling in Debra H. v. Janice R. was the 
impetus for the organization of this symposium, as well as an indicator of 
the growing level of confusion in the law of lesbian co-parentage.  But the 
decision is just one of many provocations to reconsider a basic question in 
the age of the new family: to whom do children belong?  Whether and on 
what basis a lesbian co-parent might be entitled to legal parent status turns 
on the law’s view of what makes someone a parent.  In Debra H., the court 
ruled that a lesbian co-parent was entitled to legal parent status with respect 
to her partner’s biological child, but only because the two women had 
entered into a civil union before the child was born.4  The fact that the 
plaintiff had both intended to and actually served as a social parent from 
the beginning was of no relevance, given the court’s view that parentage 
could be derived only from biology, adoption or marital status.5  Notably, 
the court rejected the de facto parentage doctrine as an alternative means of 
establishing parentage for a lesbian co-parent.6  This section will consider 
the various methods by which lesbian co-parents might, in different 
jurisdictions, obtain legal parent status. 
                                                          
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 188-89. 
 6. Id. 
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To understand Debra H., we must first consider the general landscape 
for establishing parent-child relationships within the context of planned 
lesbian families.  The law is complicated, variable, and in a constant state 
of flux.  But some general observations can be made nonetheless.  In every 
state, a woman who gives birth to a child—outside of an enforceable 
surrogacy agreement—is the legal mother of that child.  A single woman 
who adopts a child has a similarly invulnerable, legal parent-child 
relationship with the adopted child.  Thus, in a lesbian co-parenting 
arrangement, the biological or adoptive mother’s legal parent status is both 
automatic and secure.  Her partner, however, may or may not also be 
deemed a legal mother, depending on the jurisdiction and the steps taken to 
secure the legal relationship between the co-parent and the child. 
A. Second-Parent Adoption 
In several states, a lesbian co-parent can adopt her partner’s biological or 
adopted child, as long as the first legal mother consents and joins the 
petition.7  This type of adoption is “modeled on step-parent adoption, a 
statutory scheme that allows a biological (or adoptive) parent’s spouse to 
adopt a child without terminating that parent’s rights, thereby leaving the 
child with two parents.”8  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was 
the first state supreme court to countenance such an adoption, in its 1993 
ruling in Adoption of Tammy.9  Susan Love, a nationally known breast 
cancer surgeon, gave birth to a daughter, Tammy, using sperm donated by 
her female partner’s cousin.10  The donor surrendered his parental rights, 
but Helen Cooksey, the intended co-parent, was not naturally entitled to 
legal parent status even though she did have at least a remote genetic tie to 
the child.11  Instead, the two women jointly petitioned to adopt Tammy.12  
The governing statute did not explicitly rule out adoption by an unmarried 
couple, and the court allowed it to take place, given the rich evidence—
including testimony by psychologists, teachers, a priest and a nun—of the 
                                                          
 7. THE FAMILY EQUALITY COUNCIL, STATE-BY-STATE: SECOND PARENT 
ADOPTION LAWS (2008), available at 
http://www.d1083684.domain.com/down/secondparent_withcitations.pdf (surveying 
state laws on second-parent adoptions).  On the development of second-parent adoption 
for same-sex couples, see generally, JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M. 
FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 
320-29 (2011). 
 8. Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child: 
Parentage Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. 
J. C.R. & C.L. 201, 205 (2009). 
 9. 619 N.E.2d 315, 318 (Mass. 1993). 
 10. Id. at 316. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 315. 
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stable family unit the two women provided for the child.13  The Supreme 
Court of Vermont approved a lesbian second-parent adoption the same 
year.14  Since 1993, a number of states have begun, either via statute or 
appellate court ruling, to allow second-parent adoptions by a same-sex 
partner; and, in still other states, lower court rulings have clearly approved 
such adoptions, even in the absence of an explicit ruling or statute 
permitting them.15  When the California Supreme Court ruled in favor of 
same-sex second-parent adoptions in 2003, in Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 
more than 20,000 such adoptions had been granted.16 
But the landscape is still very mixed on the permissibility of these 
adoptions.  In four states, appellate courts have ruled that second-parent 
adoptions are not permitted, either generally or for same-sex couples.17  
Notably, the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled, in a child-custody 
hearing, that the second-parent adoption granted by a trial court several 
years earlier was void, and that all other second-parent adoptions granted 
by North Carolina courts were also invalid because they went beyond the 
parameters of the adoption statute.18  By statute, Utah bars adoptions by all 
unmarried couples; Mississippi does so for all same-gender couples, 
regardless of marital status.19  Arkansas voters passed a referendum in 2008 
                                                          
 13. Id. at 317-18. 
 14. See Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1272 (Vt. 1993) (holding that 
adoption does not require termination of the natural mother’s parental rights when the 
adoption is between the natural mother and her partner and is in the best interests of the 
children). 
 15. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000(f) (West 2012) (allowing adoption of a child 
by a domestic partner); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 9-5-203(1), 19-5-208(5), 19-5-210(1.5), 
19-5-211(1.5) (2012) (recognizing second parent adoption); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-
724(3) (2012) (enabling a person who shares parental responsibility for the child to 
adopt); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15a, § 1-102(b) (2012) (allowing adoption of child by a 
partner if a family unit consists of a parent and the partner and adoption is in the best 
interest of the child).  On second-parent adoptions generally, see Jane S. Schacter, 
Constructing Families in a Democracy: Courts, Legislatures, and Second-Parent 
Adoption, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 933 (2000). 
 16. 73 P.3d 554, 568, 572 (Cal. 2003). 
 17. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374, 376-77 (Neb. 2002) 
(concluding that Nebraska’s adoption statutes prohibit two unmarried persons from 
adopting a minor child together); Boseman v. Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d 494, 496, 499 (N.C. 
2010) (concluding the adoption statute requires termination of biological parents’ rights 
upon direct placement adoption); In re Adoption of Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071, 1072 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1998) (construing the Ohio adoption statute to permit adoption by an 
unmarried adult only if the biological parents’ legal rights are terminated); In re Angel 
Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 685-86 (Wis. 1994) (prohibiting adoption by a mother and 
her female cohabitant because the proposed adoption failed to satisfy essential elements 
of the adoption statute). 
 18. Boseman, 704 S.E.2d at 502. 
 19. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (2012) (“Adoption by couples of the same 
gender is prohibited.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-117 (2012) (“A child may be 
adopted by . . . adults who are legally married . . . .  A child may not be adopted by a 
person who is cohabiting in a relationship that is not a legally valid and binding 
marriage under the laws of the state.”). 
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to preclude adoption or foster-parenting by any individual who was 
“cohabiting with a sexual partner” outside of marriage.20  But, three years 
later, the Arkansas Supreme Court struck down this law as a violation of 
the right of privacy protected by the Arkansas constitution.21  Florida still 
has a statute on the books barring homosexuals, whether as individuals or 
as part of a couple, from adopting, but an appellate court struck down the 
statute on state constitutional grounds, and the attorney general declined to 
file an appeal.22 
Where otherwise available, the second-parent adoption can also be used 
to secure a second parent for an adopted child.  If a child is adopted from a 
state or foreign country that does not allow either unmarried or same-sex 
couples to adopt, it is typical for one partner to adopt as a single parent, 
followed by a second-parent adoption for the other partner.  And her 
partner has generally the same options for securing a parent-child 
relationship.  Regardless of whether the first mother gives birth or adopts a 
child, the second-parent adoption is the most reliable way to secure legal 
parent status for the lesbian co-parent because an adoption decree is 
entitled to full faith and credit in other states, even in those that are very 
hostile to same-sex relationships or gay parenting.  An appellate court in 
Florida gave effect to a Washington state decree of second-parent adoption 
that had been granted to a lesbian couple.23  The two women had broken 
up, and the non-biological mother pointed to Florida’s clear public policy 
against adoption by gays and lesbians.24  But the court refused to depart 
from the exacting rules of full faith and credit; the parent-child relationship 
created by the adoption decree was secure.25 
                                                          
 20. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-8-304, invalidated by Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Cole, 
2011 Ark. 145 (2011). 
 21. See Cole, 2011 Ark. at 149. 
 22. See In re Adoption of X.X.G. & N.R.G., 45 So. 3d 79, 81 (Fla. App. 2010); see 
also Joanna L. Grossman, Will Gays and Lesbians in Florida Finally Gain the Right to 
Adopt Children?, FINDLAW’S WRIT (Oct. 26, 2010), 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20101026.html (describing challenges to 
Florida’s gay adoption ban). 
 23. See Embry v. Ryan, 11 So. 3d 408, 409-10 (Fla. App. 2009); see also Finstuen 
v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1151 (10th Cir. 2007) (invalidating state constitutional 
amendment that bars recognition of final adoption orders from other states by same-sex 
couples because it violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause); Russell v. Bridgens, 647 
N.W.2d 56, 58-60 (Neb. 2002) (noting that courts must give full faith and credit to a 
Pennsylvania same-sex co-parent adoption unless the challenging party can prove the 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction); Starr v. Erez, No. COA99-1534 (N.C. Ct. 
App., Nov. 27, 2000).  A New York court allowed a same-sex couple to jointly adopt 
the biological child of one of the partners, even though the co-parent already had 
enforceable parental rights because the couple had legally married in the Netherlands.  
In re Adoption of Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d 677, 692-93 (Sur. Ct. 2009).  The court held 
that “the best interests of this child require a judgment that will ensure recognition of 
both Ingrid and Mona as his legal parents throughout the entire United States.”  Id. 
 24. Embry, 11 So. 3d at 409. 
 25. Id. at 409-10. 
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B. De Facto Parentage: An Overview 
When a second-parent adoption is not available or, for whatever reason, 
not sought, the rights of the lesbian co-parent become much murkier.  In 
some states, courts or the legislature have recognized either full parental or 
quasi-parental status based on a functional parent-child relationship.  This 
type of recognition can fall under many different doctrinal labels—de facto 
parentage, psychological parentage, in loco parentis, or parent by estoppel, 
to name the most common ones—and can assume many different forms.  
But the common feature of any such doctrine is that it enables an adult 
without any formal legal ties to a child to be granted legal parent, or at least 
parent-like, status.  States that do recognize de facto or psychological 
parentage disagree about the scope of the rights that accompany such a 
status.  In a few states, once a third party has established de facto or 
psychological parent status, she stands in parity to a legal parent.26  In 
others, such a status gives rise only to a potential claim for visitation, but 
not a full-fledged right to seek custody based solely on the best interests of 
the child.27 
The first appellate case to recognize a lesbian co-parent as a “de facto 
parent” was In re Custody of H.S.H.-K.28  In this 1995 case, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court relied on the concept of de facto parentage to allow a 
lesbian co-parent, who was not related to the child by blood or adoption, to 
seek visitation over the objection of the child’s biological mother.29  
Elsbeth Knott and Sandra Lynne Holtzman were intimate partners and 
planned together to start a family.30  Knott became pregnant via artificial 
insemination in 1988 and gave birth to a child in December of that year.31  
Holtzman participated in every aspect of pregnancy and childbirth, 
including taking leave from work to care for the newborn child; they gave 
the child a combined surname, were both named as parents at a religious 
dedication ceremony, and shared child-care responsibilities.32  For the first 
four years of the child’s life, the two women functioned in every way as co-
parents.33  The two women ended their relationship early in 1993, but 
                                                          
 26. See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 554 (N.J. 2000) (holding that the 
psychological parent “stands in parity with the legal parent,” and “[c]ustody and 
visitation issues between them are to be determined on a best interests standard”). 
 27. See, e.g., In re H.S.H.-K, 533 N.W.2d 419, 420 (Wis. 1995) (noting that 
custody cannot be granted to a de facto parent without evidence that the legal parent is 
unfit). 
 28. See id. at 421. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 421-22. 
 33. Id. 
7
Grossman: The New Illegitimacy: Tying Parentage to Marital Status for Lesbi
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2012
  
678 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 20:3 
agreed to continue living under the same roof for the sake of the child.34  
Nonetheless, Knott moved out with the child a few months later and, after 
another year, cut off all contact between Holtzman and the child.35  
Holtzman filed a petition for custody and a petition for visitation shortly 
thereafter.36 
Under the Wisconsin code, courts were given jurisdiction to adjudicate 
custody in the wake of an annulment, divorce, or separation.37  The 
Wisconsin Legislature also expressly gave courts the authority to place a 
child with a non-parent, in the event both parents were unfit or unable to 
care for the child.38  Holtzman’s claim did not fit within either of these 
provisions.39  Yet, the state’s highest court concluded, she had standing to 
seek visitation with the child.40  Taken together, the statutes governing 
custody and visitation showed the “continuing legislative concern with 
identifying the triggering events that warrant state interference in an 
otherwise protected parent-child relationship.”41  The court went on to 
recognize an equitable right for Holtzman to seek visitation based on her 
functional parent-child relationship, notwithstanding the inapplicability of 
various custody and visitation statutes to her situation.42  Knott argued that 
any recognition of the relationship between Holtzman and the child over 
Knott’s objection would violate her constitutional parental rights.43  But the 
court observed that those rights are not absolute; state public policy “directs 
the court to respect and protect parental autonomy and at the same time to 
serve the best interest of the child.”44 
In this type of case, the balance was struck by allowing a court to hear a 
petition for visitation when “it determines that the petitioner has a parent-
like relationship with the child and that a significant triggering event 
justifies state intervention in the child’s relationship with a biological or 
adoptive parent.”45  The parent-like relationship is established through four 
elements: (1) consent by the biological parent to foster the formation of the 
parent-child relationship; (2) living in the same household with the child; 
(3) assuming the obligations of parenthood, including support and 
                                                          
 34. Id. at 422. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.41(1)(b) (West 2011). 
 38. Id. at § 767.41(3). 
 39. In re H.S.H.-K, 533 N.W.2d at 424. 
 40. Id. at 435. 
 41. Id. at 427. 
 42. Id. at 435-36. 
 43. Id. at 434. 
 44. Id. at 435. 
 45. Id. at 421.  The scope and source of federal constitutional protection for 
parental rights is summarized supra text accompanying notes 170-181. 
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childrearing; and (4) sufficient duration to establish “with the child a 
bonded, dependent relationship parental in nature.”46  The triggering event, 
in turn, must be established with proof that the biological parent interfered 
with the petitioner’s parent-like relationship and that the petitioner sought 
court-ordered visitation “within a reasonable time.”47  Once established, the 
de facto parent must also show that visitation is in the child’s best 
interests.48  Holtzman’s petition for visitation was remanded for application 
of these tests—was she a de facto parent, was a triggering event sufficient 
to justify state intervention, and would visitation be in the best interests of 
the child? 
The four-part test established in this case has become the standard one 
adopted by courts in several other states to determine whether a parent-like 
relationship exists.49  And whether or not they follow the exact standard 
from H.S.H.-K, a few legislatures have provided for this quasi-parental 
status by statute.50  These states still vary in defining the rights that come 
with de facto parent status, but they agree that a lesbian co-parent who 
qualifies could gain at least visitation rights, if not full parental rights, 
based on the existence of a functional parent-child relationship.51 
Recognition of de facto parentage, however, is far from universal.  
Several states have rejected it outright.52  Their chief concern is intruding 
on the rights of the biological mother, in violation of her constitutionally 
protected parental rights.53  Courts also cite the lack of certainty about 
                                                          
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 436. 
 48. See id. at 421 (focusing on the best interests of the child as a means to protect 
the child from turmoil and hostility during the dissolution of a non-traditional adult 
relationship). 
 49. See, e.g., In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 559-60 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004); Rubano 
v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 974 (R.I. 2000). 
 50. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-101 (2011) (considering marriage 
between persons of the same gender to be void but recognizing children of these 
marriages as legitimate); see also Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920, 925, 930-32 (Del. 
2011) (upholding de facto parentage statute against constitutional challenge and 
awarding joint custody to adoptive mother and lesbian de facto parent). 
 51. See, e.g., In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 176-77 (Wash. 2005) 
(recognizing de facto parent status in legal parity with an otherwise legal parent). 
 52. See, e.g., Guardianship of Z.C.W. and K.G.W., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 48, 49-50 (Ct. 
App. 1999); Smith v. Gordon, 968 A.2d 1, 2-3 (Del. 2009), superseded by statute DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-101; Wakeman v. Dixon, 921 So. 2d 669, 673 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2006); Matter of Visitation with C.B.L., 723 N.E.2d 316, 320-21 (Ill. App. 1999); 
B.F. v. T.D., 194 S.W.3d 310, 312 (Ky. 2006); Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73, 
74-75, 81 (Md. 2008); White v. White, 293 S.W.3d 1, 9, 11 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009); 
Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 186 (N.Y. 2010); In re Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 
913, 923 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808, 809-10 (Utah 2007); 
Stadter v. Siperko, 661 S.E.2d 494, 499-501 (Va. Ct. App. 2008); Titchenal v. Dexter, 
693 A.2d 682, 683-85 (Vt. 1997). 
 53. See, e.g., Black v. Simms, 12 So. 3d 1140, 1143 (La. Ct. App. 2009) (rejecting 
de facto parentage in light of “the paramount right of a parent in the care, custody, and 
control of his or [sic] child” that can be abrogated only “in rare circumstances”); Janice 
9
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parental status as a reason to reject de facto parentage,54 and the lack of 
statutory authority to create a quasi-parental status not obviously provided 
for by the legislature.55   
New York’s highest court has twice rejected de facto parentage, in cases 
that were nineteen years apart and came at very different points in the gay 
rights revolution.  In 1991, in Alison D. v. Virginia M., the New York Court 
of Appeals held that only a child’s biological or adoptive parent could seek 
visitation against the wishes of a fit custodial parent.56  It specifically 
rejected an argument for any sort of recognition for functional parents—
those who participate in crucial aspects of parenting without the benefit of 
a formal tie to the child.57  The court in Alison D. was interpreting Section 
70 of the New York Domestic Relations Law, which allows “either parent” 
to petition for custody or visitation, the determination of which is to be 
based on “what is for the best interest of the child, and what will best 
promote its welfare and happiness . . . .”58  Grandparents or siblings can 
seek visitation under separate provisions, which narrowly define the 
circumstances under which such visitation could be granted over the 
objection of a parent.59  But the statute does not define “parent.”60  In 
                                                          
M., 948 A.2d at 680-95 (finding no justification for elevating de facto parent above 
other third parties seeking to obtain custody or visitation over the natural parent’s 
objection); In re Thompson, 11 S.W.3d at 918-19; Jones, 154 P.3d at 819 (refusing to 
recognize de facto parentage because doing so “would abrogate a portion of [the 
biological mother’s] parental rights”); Titchenal, 693 A.2d at 687 (noting the “potential 
dangers of forcing parents to defend third-party visitation claims”). 
 54. See infra text accompanying notes 98-100; see also, e.g., Debra H., 930 N.E.2d 
at 190-92; Jones, 154 P.3d at 816 (declining to adopt de facto parentage doctrine 
because it “fails to provide an identifiable jurisdictional test that may be easily and 
uniformly applied in all cases”). 
 55. See, e.g., Z.C.W., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 50-51; Jones, 154 P.3d at 810 (“We 
decline to extend the common law doctrine of in loco parentis to create standing where 
it does not arise by statute.”); Titchenal, 693 A.2d at 689 (“Given the complex social 
and practical ramifications of expanding the classes of persons entitled to assert 
parental rights by seeking custody or visitation, the Legislature is better equipped to 
deal with the problem.”). 
 56. 572 N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. 1991) (finding a woman with a live-in relationship 
with the child’s mother not a “parent” within the statutory meaning). 
 57. See id. at 28-29 (recognizing that the legislature grants standing to certain third 
parties such as grandparents and siblings to seek visitation and concluding that the 
legislature did not confer standing to de-facto nonparent). 
 58. N.Y. DOM. REL. § 70 (McKinney 2011). 
 59. Id. §§ 71, 72.  Third-party visitation statutes have fallen under closer judicial 
scrutiny since the Supreme Court’s ruling in Troxel v. Granville, in which it held that 
Washington state’s visitation statute was unconstitutional as applied to a widowed 
mother by allowing paternal grandparent visitation over her objection.  See 530 U.S. 
57, 66 (2000).  The New York provision for grandparent visitation was upheld against 
a Troxel challenge in E.S. v. P.D., 8 N.Y. 3d 150 (2007).  There, the Court of Appeals 
held that the statute was constitutional on its face and as applied because it only 
allowed grandparents to petition for visitation if one or both of the parents were 
deceased or “where circumstances show that conditions exist which equity would see 
fit to intervene . . . .”  Id. at 156.  This threshold showing effectively creates a 
presumption against visitation over a parent’s objection, which constitutes sufficient 
10
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Alison D., two women, who were living together, decided that one of them 
would try to conceive a child through artificial insemination.61  Virginia M. 
gave birth to a child, and she and Alison D. shared all parenting 
responsibilities for the first two years of the child’s life.62  After they 
separated, Virginia allowed visitation for a time, but she eventually stopped 
contact between Alison and the child.63  Alison then sued to be recognized 
as the child’s parent, characterizing herself as a “de facto parent” or, 
alternatively, as a “parent by estoppel.”64  Although Alison did not give 
birth to the child, she participated in every other respect in planning for the 
child’s conception and in parenting.65  She did not adopt the child, but at 
the time, it was not clearly established under New York law that a lesbian 
co-parent could adopt her partner’s child, an issue that was later resolved in 
favor of co-parent adoption.66 
In Alison D., the New York Court of Appeals took a very strict view of 
parentage, noting that “[t]raditionally, in this State it is the child’s mother 
and father who, assuming fitness, have the right to the care and custody of 
their child, even in some situations where the non-parent has exercised 
some control over the child with the parents’ consent.”67  Alison, in the 
court’s view, was simply a non-parent seeking to displace a fit parent’s 
decision about her child’s best interests.68 
Almost twenty years later, the New York Court of Appeals was asked to 
reconsider its ruling in Alison D. by another lesbian co-parent, in Debra H. 
v. Janice R., the case highlighted in this symposium.  The world had 
changed dramatically during that time for lesbian and gay families.  Same-
sex marriage became legal in some states, and marriage-like statuses 
emerged in several others.  Gay and lesbian parents gained greater judicial 
and legislative protection for the parent-child relationships they had formed 
functionally—including greater recognition of second-parent adoption, 
joint adoption by unmarried (including same-sex) couples, as well as by the 
                                                          
deference to parental rights under Troxel. 
 60. See N.Y. DOM. REL. § 70. 
 61. Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 28. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 28-29. 
 65. Id. at 28. 
 66. See In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 398 (N.Y. 1995) (holding that lesbian and 
unmarried heterosexual partners have standing to become adoptive parents). 
 67. Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 29. 
 68. Id.  The Supreme Court would later make clear that a fit parent must 
constitutionally be presumed to act in the child’s best interest.  See Troxel v. Granville, 
530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000).  A court’s decision to override a fit parent’s decision, thus, 
must be predicated on “special weight” to the parent’s determination of the child’s best 
interests.  Id. at 69. 
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doctrines of de facto parentage and intended parentage.  Thus, Debra was, 
in important ways, posing a different question to the New York court about 
her parental rights.  But, as discussed below, she received the same answer: 
New York does not recognize de facto parentage. 
In November 2003, a pregnant Janice R. entered into a civil union with 
Debra H., a woman with whom she had an intimate relationship.69  In 
December 2003, Janice gave birth to a son, M.R.70  While New York now 
allows second-parent adoption for gay and lesbian co-parents,71 Janice 
“repeatedly rebuffed” Debra’s requests to adopt M.R.72  Nonetheless, the 
two women co-parented the boy from his birth until they separated in 
2006.73  After the separation, with Janice’s consent, Debra had in-person 
visitation with M.R. three times a week and telephone contact every day.74  
In 2008, however, Janice began restricting Debra’s visitation time, and 
eventually cut off all contact.75  In May 2008, Debra filed a petition seeking 
joint physical and legal custody of M.R.76  Pending resolution of Debra’s 
claim, Janice agreed to reinstate the three-day-a-week visitation schedule 
they had used earlier, as long as a nanny or other third party accompanied 
M.R. on his visits with Debra.77 
Debra’s petition was premised on two alternative theories.  First, she 
claimed that Janice was equitably “estopped” from denying that Debra was 
also a parent to M.R. given her consent to Debra’s functional role in the 
child’s life.78  In other words, Debra contended that because Janice had 
acted as if Debra had a parental right to see M.R.—and Debra had in fact 
functioned as a parent—Janice was now bound to recognize that right by 
allowing shared custody or visitation.79  Second, Debra claimed that she 
was entitled to “legal parent” status by virtue of the couple’s Vermont civil 
union, which carries with it all the legal rights and obligations of 
marriage.80  Ultimately, the state’s highest court rejected the first argument, 
but accepted the second.81 
                                                          
 69. Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 186 (N.Y. 2010). 
 70. Id. 
 71. See, e.g., In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995). 
 72. Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 186. 
 73. Id. at 186-88.  The nature and extent of Debra’s parenting role is a disputed fact 
that was left for resolution on remand.  Id. at 197. 
 74. Id. at 186. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 186-87. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See id. at 186 (noting that when the parties first separated, they had established 
a set visitation schedule). 
 80. Id. at 195. 
 81. Id. at 194, 197. 
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The trial court had agreed only with Debra’s first argument, concluding 
that she had established a prima facie case to invoke equitable estoppel as a 
means to secure visitation and custody rights.82  That court then ordered 
another hearing to sort out the facts relating to this question: Did Debra in 
fact function as a parent, such that she possessed the rights that come with 
that status?83 
Before that hearing could take place, however, Janice appealed the 
court’s ruling that equitable estoppel could be invoked in this context—and 
the appellate court agreed that the ruling had been in error.84  In an April 
2009 ruling, the Appellate Division unanimously vacated the trial court’s 
order, concluding that Debra could not seek visitation or custody under 
New York law because, despite serving “as a loving and caring parental 
figure during the first 2 1/2 years of the child’s life,” New York law does 
not recognize the parental rights of any adult other than a legal, biological, 
or adoptive parent.85 
The basic question, as in similar cases, is whether Debra is M.R.’s 
parent?  This is not merely a factual question, but a legal one: Does Debra 
meet any of the law’s criteria for “legal parent” status?  Under New York 
law, a woman is clearly entitled to legal-mother status if she gives birth to a 
child or has legally adopted him.86  As discussed below, the court 
ultimately recognized Debra H. as a legal parent by virtue of her civil union 
to the biological mother, but it refused to recognize her as a de facto parent, 
based on her functional role in raising the child.87 
The state’s highest court rejected the de facto parentage doctrine as a 
means to extend parental or quasi-parental rights to anyone other than a 
legal, biological, or adoptive parent.88  Three judges concurred in the result, 
but did not agree with reaffirming the Alison D. holding.89  Judges Ciparick 
and Lippman concluded that Alison D. should be overruled.90  Judge Smith 
would not have adopted the de facto parentage doctrine as it was proposed, 
but urged instead a narrower doctrine—one that would grant parentage to 
                                                          
 82. Debra H. v. Janice R., No. 106569/08, 2008 WL 7675822, at *16 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. Oct. 2, 2008) (finding the civil union argument relevant to, but not dispositive of, 
the question of parental rights), rev’d 877 N.Y.S.2d 259 (App. Div. 2009), rev’d 930 
N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2010). 
 83. Id. at *17. 
 84. See Debra H. v. Janice R., 877 N.Y.S.2d 259, 260 (App. Div. 2009), rev’d 930 
N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2010). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Cf. N.Y. DOM. REL. § 124 (McKinney 2011) (providing that a birth mother’s 
participation in a surrogacy agreement has no adverse effect on her parental rights, 
status, or obligations). 
 87. Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 189, 193-94 (N.Y. 2010). 
 88. See id. at 194. 
 89. Id. at 201, 203, 206. 
 90. Id. at 201, 206. 
13
Grossman: The New Illegitimacy: Tying Parentage to Marital Status for Lesbi
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2012
  
684 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 20:3 
an adult for a child who was conceived through anonymous donor 
insemination by one member of a same-sex couple, then living together, 
with the knowledge and consent of the other.91 
In seeking to have the Debra H. court overturn Alison D., Debra argued 
that the court had implicitly departed from the hard line it took in Shondel 
J. v. Mark D.92  In that case, the New York Court of Appeals found a man 
who held himself out as a child’s biological father for four and a half years 
liable for child support, even though DNA tests proved he was not 
genetically related to the child.93  The court relied on the concept of 
paternity by estoppel to prevent the man from avoiding child support 
obligations.94 
A man who harbors doubts about his biological paternity of a child has a 
choice to make.  He may either put the doubts aside and initiate a 
parental relationship with the child, or insist on a scientific test of 
paternity before initiating a parental relationship. . . . It is not an easy 
choice, but at times, the law intersects with the province of personal 
relationships and some strain is inevitable.  This should not be allowed to 
distract the Family Court from its principal purpose in paternity and 
support proceedings—to serve the best interests of the child.95 
Is it inconsistent for the court to use estoppel principles to determine 
parentage for child support purposes, but not for purposes of allowing 
custody or visitation?  The court in Debra H. said no.  It pointed to a 
difference in the language of the statute governing child support versus the 
one governing parental custody—the former specifically directs courts to 
consider “equitable estoppel” before deciding whether to order paternity 
testing, while the latter does not mention the concept.96  However, the real 
explanation is that courts often take a broader approach to defining 
parentage in the child support context, than in the custody/visitation 
context, for fear of depriving a child of necessary support, particularly 
where the child is already financially dependent on the parent. 
The court in Debra H. defended its affirmation of Alison D. based on one 
primary goal: “promot[ing] certainty in the wake of domestic breakups.”97  
It sought to avoid “disruptive battles over parentage as a prelude to further 
potential combat over custody and visitation” and hearings that “are likely 
often to be contentious, costly, and lengthy.”98  This singular emphasis on 
                                                          
 91. Id. at 203-05. 
 92. Id. at 190; Shondel J. v. Mark D, 853 N.E.2d 610 (N.Y. 2006). 
 93. See Shondel J., 853 N.E.2d at 612-13. 
 94. See id. at 615-17. 
 95. Id. at 617. 
 96. Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 190-91. 
 97. Id. at 191. 
 98. Id. at 191-92. 
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certainty blinded the court to other relevant concerns, as well as to the 
perhaps unintended consequences of a bright-line rule.99 
Indeed, the bright-line rule of Alison D. does clarify parental rights in 
most cases without the need for litigation.  But whether predictability is the 
most important goal when considering parentage of a child was a question 
left unanswered.  As Section III suggests, the certainty may come at the 
expense of the welfare of children who sometimes develop strong 
relationships with adults who do not fit the clearly demarcated role of 
“legal parent.”  There are, after all, consequences to applying bright-line 
rules like the one that was reaffirmed in Debra H.  De facto parents lose the 
children they have been raising—and, in many instances today, whom they 
intended to parent prior to conception, and the children lose an adult with 
whom they shared a functional parent-child relationship.  This latter 
consequence is especially troubling given the law’s commitment, in the 
custody context, to continuity of care for children. 
C. Parentage Through Marital Status: The “New Illegitimacy” 
Despite the adverse holding on de facto parentage, Debra H. was, in the 
end, granted “legal parent” status vis-à-vis M.R.100  The New York Court of 
Appeals ruled that because Debra and Janice had entered into a Vermont 
civil union before M.R. was born, Debra was his legal parent.101  While this 
ruling is ultimately supportive of lesbian co-parenting rights, it is narrowly 
drawn to recognize such rights only when the couple involved is part of a 
formal, recognized relationship such as a civil union or a same-sex 
marriage.  It thus reinvigorates the waning tie between legitimacy and 
parentage in the context of lesbian co-parents—a tie that, as described 
above, has waned in other contexts.  Under this ruling, a legitimate child of 
lesbian co-parents has two legal parents, while an “illegitimate” child, in 
the absence of a second-parent adoption, has only one.102 
Why did the civil union between Debra and Janice come with parental 
rights?  The New York Court of Appeals recognized Debra’s parental 
status out of respect for Vermont’s laws, which recognize that civil union 
partners are presumptively the parents of children born during the union to 
either partner—just as men are presumptively the parents of children born 
                                                          
 99. See, e.g., Carlos Ball, Rendering Children Illegitimate in Former Partner 
Parenting Cases: Hiding Behind the Facade of Certainty, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 623 (2012); Nancy D. Polikoff, The New “Illegitimacy”: Winning 
Backward in the Protection of the Children of Lesbian Couples, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER, 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 721 (2012). 
 100. Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 200. 
 101. Id. at 197. 
 102. See id. at 200, 204 (Smith, J., concurring) (arguing for a special status to avoid 
rendering children of same-sex couples illegitimate). 
15
Grossman: The New Illegitimacy: Tying Parentage to Marital Status for Lesbi
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2012
  
686 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 20:3 
to their wives during a marriage.103  This ruling required two steps—first, 
the court had to make a finding as to what Vermont law says regarding the 
effects of a civil union on parentage; and, second, the court had to decide 
whether Vermont’s law should be given effect in New York.104 
Although Vermont now offers full marriage equality to same-sex 
couples,105 its legislature broke new ground in 2000 when it adopted civil 
unions for same-sex couples, a legal status that was identical to marriage in 
all respects other than name.106  The enacting statute provided that parties 
to a civil union shall have “all the same benefits, protections and 
responsibilities under law . . . as are granted to spouses in a marriage,” 
including the enjoyment of the same rights “with respect to a child of 
whom either becomes the natural parent during the term of a civil 
union.”107 
This provision was tested in a 2006 case, Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-
Jenkins.108  In that case, a lesbian couple entered into a civil union and then 
together planned for one of them to become pregnant via artificial 
insemination.109  Although one partner, Lisa, was the biological mother, 
both women were involved in every aspect of the conception, birth, and 
early rearing of the child, IMJ.110  Thirteen months after the child’s birth, 
however, Lisa took the child and fled to Virginia, a state that is notoriously 
hostile to same-sex couples.111  (The biological mother herself became 
hostile to them after becoming a born-again Christian and declaring 
homosexuality a sin from which she intended to shield her daughter.)  Lisa 
filed a petition in Vermont family court to dissolve her civil union with 
Janet.112  In her complaint, she “listed IMJ as the ‘biological or adoptive 
child[] of the civil union’” and requested an order on custody and 
visitation.113  The family court issued a temporary order, ruling that IMJ 
                                                          
 103. See id. at 195 (noting that Vermont’s statute accords the same benefits, 
protections and responsibilities to parties in a civil union as spouses in a marriage). 
 104. Id. at 194. 
 105. An Act to Protect Religious Freedom and Recognize Equality in Civil 
Marriage, S.B. 115, 2009-2010 Leg. (Vt. 2009). 
 106. Spurred by a ruling of the state’s highest court that denying same-sex couples 
the benefits of marriage was a violation of the state constitution’s Common Benefits 
Clause, the legislature passed a law to create the civil union.  See Baker v. State, 744 
A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999); see also An Act to Create Civil Unions, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 
1201-05 (2000) (partially repealed 2009).  Per the Act to Protect Religious Freedom 
and Recognize Equality in Civil Marriage, supra note 105, new civil unions can no 
longer be created in Vermont, but existing ones will continue to be recognized.  Id. 
 107. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(a), (f) (2012). 
 108. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951 (Vt. 2006). 
 109. Id. at 956. 
 110. Id. at 970. 
 111. Id. at 956. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 951. 
16
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 11
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol20/iss3/11
  
2012] TYING PARENTAGE TO MARITAL STATUS 687 
had two legal mothers and awarding primary custodial rights to Lisa and 
“parent-child contact” both in person and over the phone to Janet.114  Lisa 
permitted only one in-person visitation before cutting off all contact 
between Janet and IMJ.115  She then successfully sought an order from a 
Virginia county court denying Janet’s parentage.116  The case was a 
procedural (and personal) nightmare, with many steps, in what turned into 
an interstate parental rights dispute.  Ultimately, however, the Vermont 
Supreme Court affirmed Janet’s parentage of IMJ, and the Virginia 
Supreme Court deferred to the ruling under principles of full faith and 
credit.117 
Why was Janet entitled to visitation with IMJ?  The Vermont Supreme 
Court gave two reasons.  First, it applied the in loco parentis doctrine—
similar to the de facto parentage doctrine in other states—which allows a 
court to order custody or visitation to an adult like a stepparent who has 
acted as a parent when extraordinary circumstances justify such an order.118  
Janet was entitled at least to visitation under this doctrine.  Second, the 
court ruled that Janet had full status as a parent to IMJ.119  The court did 
not, however, base its ruling on the marital presumption of parentage.120  
As mentioned above, the civil union legislation promises that civil union 
partners shall have the same rights as spouses with respect to “a child of 
whom either becomes the natural parent during the term of the civil 
union.”121  The rights of married couples in this respect are governed by 
another statute, the Parentage Proceedings Act, which provides, “[a] person 
alleged to be a parent shall be rebuttably presumed to be the natural parent 
of a child if . . . the child is born while the husband and wife are legally 
married to each other.”122  Although one could argue that this marital 
presumption applies with equal force to a lesbian civil union couple, if the 
lack of a biological connection is sufficient to rebut the presumption, then it 
is ultimately of little use.  The Vermont Supreme Court ruled that this latter 
                                                          
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 956-57. 
 117. Id. at 965, 972-73.  The case continues to this day because, although the legal 
rights of Lisa and Janet with respect to IMJ have been finally determined, Lisa took 
IMJ and disappeared in violation of the custody order.  The search for her is ongoing.  
See Criminal Complaint, United States v. Timothy Miller, No. 2:11-mj-28-1 (D. Vt. 
2011) [hereinafter Criminal Complaint], available at 
http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/cases/miller-jenkins-v-miller-jenkins/miller-jenkins-
criminal-complaint.pdf (noting that both Lisa and her brother, Timothy Miller, were 
charged with crimes related to IMJ’s disappearance). 
 118. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d at 967. 
 119. Id. at 969-70. 
 120. Id. at 970-71. 
 121. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(f) (2012). 
 122. Id. § 308. 
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section was irrelevant in Miller-Jenkins; instead, it looked directly at the 
facts relevant to parentage under Vermont law and concluded: 
Many factors are present here that support a conclusion that Janet is a 
parent, including, first and foremost, that Janet and Lisa were in a valid 
legal union at the time of the child’s birth.  The other factors include the 
following.  It was the expectation and intent of both Lisa and Janet that 
Janet would be IMJ’s parent.  Janet participated in the decision that Lisa 
would be artificially inseminated to bear a child and participated actively 
in the prenatal care and birth.  Both Lisa and Janet treated Janet as IMJ’s 
parent during the time they resided together, and Lisa identified Janet as 
a parent of IMJ in the dissolution petition.  Finally, there is no other 
claimant to the status of parent, and, as a result, a negative decision 
would leave IMJ with only one parent.  The sperm donor was 
anonymous and is making no claim to be IMJ’s parent.  If Janet had been 
Lisa’s husband, these factors would make Janet the parent of the child 
born from the artificial insemination.  Because of the equality of 
treatment of partners in civil unions, the same result applies to Lisa.123 
The court drew on the large number of decisions finding husbands to be 
the legal fathers of their wives’ children, even when the children were 
conceived with donor sperm.124  The reasons vary, but the end result is 
almost always the same: a co-parent who intends to become the legal 
parent of a child conceived via artificial insemination with donor sperm is a 
legal parent.  In the Vermont court’s view, this was “not a close case,” in 
part because the “couple’s legal union at the time of the child’s birth is 
extremely persuasive evidence of joint parentage.”125  The perceived 
benefits of legitimacy were clearly important to the court in focusing so 
heavily on the couple’s status vis-à-vis each other. 
Recall that the New York court in Debra H. undertook to understand and 
apply Vermont’s parentage law, as explicated in Miller-Jenkins.  The New 
York court cited Vermont’s statutes providing, respectively, for a marital 
presumption of paternity and for equal treatment for civil union couples 
and observed that: 
[i]n Miller-Jenkins, the Vermont Supreme Court relied upon these 
provisions to hold that a child born by artificial insemination to one 
partner of a civil union should be deemed the other partner’s child under 
Vermont law for purposes of determining custodial rights following the 
civil union’s dissolution.  The court concluded that in the context of 
marriage, a child born by artificial insemination was deemed the child of 
the husband even absent a biological connection.  In light of section 
1204 and by parity of reasoning, the court decided that the same result 
                                                          
 123. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d at 970. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 971. 
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pertained to the partner in the civil union with no biological connection 
to the child.126 
As Nancy Polikoff and Carlos Ball persuasively argue, the New York 
Court of Appeals clearly misconstrued the holding and reasoning in Miller-
Jenkins.127  Parentage was not assigned to Janet based solely on the civil 
union; in fact, the court expressly rejected that approach and looked instead 
at a variety of factors.128 
In Debra H., Janice also argued that Miller-Jenkins should not apply 
because, in that case, the child was conceived after the civil union was 
established, whereas M.R. was born after Debra’s and Janice’s civil union 
ceremony but conceived before it took place.129  But, the New York court 
held that, under Vermont law, this distinction was irrelevant, because the 
Miller-Jenkins court had emphasized several times that its finding of joint 
parentage was premised on the fact that the child was born after the couple 
became legal partners regardless of the timing of conception.130  Indeed, the 
New York court noted, “entering into the civil union at a time when both 
partners know that one of them is pregnant by artificial insemination might 
well be viewed as presenting an even stronger case than Miller-Jenkins to 
support the nonbiological partner’s parentage [and] [t]here is certainly no 
potential for misunderstanding, ignorance or deceit under such 
circumstances.”131  Janice also argued that the civil union was “of utterly no 
consequence” to her and that she acquiesced only to avoid further nagging 
by Debra.132  But the court was unpersuaded that this, even if true, should 
matter.  Regardless of her “motivation or expectation,” Janice “chose to 
travel to Vermont to enter into a civil union,” and this, because of Miller-
Jenkins, turned Debra into a legal parent of Janice’s biological child.133 
But the conclusion that Vermont law would likely recognize Debra as 
M.R.’s legal parent because of the civil union—correct or not—is not 
dispositive.  A New York court still has the choice whether to give effect to 
Vermont law, when its own laws are different or in conflict.  Courts 
generally are forced to recognize adoption orders from other states because 
legal judgments are subject to the most exacting form of “full faith and 
credit”—the requirement that each state honor legal acts and judgments 
from sister states.  But the question whether to honor another state’s law, as 
opposed to another state’s court’s order or judgment, is subject to much 
                                                          
 126. Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 195 (N.Y. 2010). 
 127. See supra note 99.  
 128. See id. 
 129. Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 195. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 196. 
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less exacting standards.134  When “asked to apply the law of a sister state,” 
states need only observe “certain minimum requirements.”135  A state can 
choose not to defer to another state’s law as long as it has “a significant 
contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such 
that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”136  
Thus, the decision to defer, for example, to another state’s parentage laws 
is an exercise of comity—respect for sister states—not a constitutional 
obligation. 
In Debra H., the court opted to rely expressly on this notion of “comity” 
to defer to Vermont’s parentage rules.137  It found no evidence in New 
York law of a public policy that is opposed to the recognition of same-sex 
co-parents—indeed, it found the state’s law was entirely consistent with 
broad recognition of parental rights for same-sex couples.138  Although the 
New York legislature has since passed a law legalizing same-sex marriage, 
it had not yet done so when Debra H. was decided.139  New York permits 
one person to adopt the children of a same-sex partner, and permits same-
sex couples to jointly adopt children.140  Consequently, the court reasoned 
that an exercise of comity would not “undermine the certainty that Alison 
D. promises biological and adoptive parents and their children: whether 
there has been a civil union in Vermont is as determinable as whether there 
                                                          
 134. Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 516 (1953). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (quoting Allstate Ins. 
Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981)); see also Williams v. North Carolina, 317 
U.S. 287, 294-98, n.6 (1942) (stating that principles of full faith and credit do “not 
require one state to substitute for its own statute . . . the conflicting statutes of another 
state, even though that statute is of controlling force in the courts of the state of its 
enactment with respect to the same persons and events” (quoting Pacific Employers 
Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 502 (1939))). 
 137. One irony of the court’s ruling on this point is its contrast with the way in 
which New York has treated Vermont civil unions in other contexts.  In a highly-
publicized case, Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, New York’s Appellate Division 
refused to allow a man to pursue a wrongful death action for the loss of his same-sex 
partner through alleged medical malpractice.  802 N.Y.S.2d 476 (App. Div. 2005).  
Although the men had entered into a civil union in Vermont, the court ruled there that a 
civil union partner is not a “spouse” for purposes of New York’s wrongful death law, 
which only allows next-of-kin to sue.  Id.  If the court had deferred to Vermont law 
under principles of comity in that case—which the trial court in the same case had 
done—then the outcome would clearly have been different.  Vermont law grants all the 
benefits of marriage to civil union partners, and one of those benefits is standing to sue 
for wrongful death.  Yet, the New York court dismissed the request for comity out of 
hand and gave no attention to New York’s long history of recognizing prohibited 
marriages from out of state.  Id.  It may be that the court has good reasons for giving 
effect to a civil union for one purpose and not another, but the burden is on the court to 
explain any distinction it draws and, thus far, it has not persuasively done so. 
 138. Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 196-97. 
 139. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 10-a, 10-b (McKinney 2011). 
 140. See, e.g., In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995). 
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has been a second-parent adoption.”141  It would thus “not lead to 
protracted litigation over standing and is consistent with New York’s 
public policy by affording predictability to parents and children alike.”142 
Accordingly, because Debra would have been considered a legal parent 
in Vermont, as the court held, she is entitled to that same status in New 
York—a status that entitled her to seek visitation and custody at a best-
interests-of-the-child hearing under section 70.143  Although the outcome of 
such a hearing is not foreordained, there is a strong presumption that fit 
parents should be afforded at least some parenting time with their children. 
While Vermont’s law on parentage for same-sex spouses is not as clear 
as the New York court would have us believe, it is supportive of the idea 
that parentage of each other’s children is a natural consequence of 
marriage—or civil union.  A similar approach seems to be taken in most of 
the states that permit same-sex couples to marry or attain some equivalent 
status.  California’s domestic partnership law, for example, provides that 
the “rights and obligations of registered domestic partners with respect to a 
child of either of them shall be the same as those of spouses.”144  And the 
law separately provides that a husband is the presumed father of a child 
born to his wife.145  By implication, then, a woman can be the presumed 
(second) legal mother of a child born to her female domestic partner.  New 
Jersey and Illinois follow a similar approach for civil union partners,146 as 
does Nevada for domestic partners.147  The same argument can be made in 
most of the full marriage equality states, since they generally provide that 
same-sex spouses are subject to all the rights and obligations of opposite-
sex spouses.148 
                                                          
 141. Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 196. 
 142. Id. at 197. 
 143. Id. at 200. 
 144. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(d) (West 2012); see also D.C. CODE § 16-909(a-1)(1) 
(West 2012). 
 145. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(a). 
 146. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-31 (West 2012) (providing that the “rights of civil 
union couples with respect to a child of whom either becomes the parent during the 
term of the civil union, shall be the same as those of a married couple with respect to a 
child of whom either spouse or partner in a civil union couple becomes the parent 
during the marriage”); Id. § 9:17-43 (providing that a man is “presumed to be the 
biological father of a child if . . . (1) [h]e and the child’s biological mother are or have 
been married to each other and the child is born during the marriage, or within 300 
days after the marriage is terminated by death, annulment or divorce”); Id. § 9:17-44 
(providing that a married woman’s husband is “treated in law as if he were the natural 
father of a child thereby conceived” if the wife conceives a child with donor sperm, 
under the supervision of a physician and with the consent of her husband); see also 410 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 535/12 (West 2012); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/212, 5/303, 
40/2, 40/3, 45/5. 
 147. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 122A.200(d) (West 2012).  
    148.     See, e.g., WASH. S.B. 6239, at § 1(3) (effective June 1, 2012) (“Where necessary 
to implement the rights and responsibilities of spouses under law, gender specific terms 
21
Grossman: The New Illegitimacy: Tying Parentage to Marital Status for Lesbi
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2012
  
692 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 20:3 
These regimes lay the groundwork for lesbian co-parentage by virtue of 
marital status, but no statute is foolproof.  After all, if the statutes provide 
that same-sex spouses are entitled to the same rights and benefits as 
opposite-sex ones, and the marital presumption of paternity is rebuttable 
through evidence of a lack of a biological connection, how strong is the 
right of joint parentage?  The one thing we know about the lesbian co-
parent is that she is not the child’s biological mother. 
The D.C. Code anticipates this problem and treats the question of lesbian 
co-parentage more explicitly.  It provides that there is “a presumption that a 
woman is the mother of a child if she and the child’s mother are or have 
been married, or in a domestic partnership, at the time of either conception 
or birth, or between conception or birth, and the child is born during the 
marriage or domestic partnership, or within 300 days after termination of 
marital cohabitation . . . or the domestic partnership . . . .”149  This 
presumption can be rebutted with “clear and convincing evidence that the 
presumed parent did not hold herself out as a parent of the child.”150 
Although the approaches vary by jurisdiction and are often ambiguous, 
there is no question that the general trend is towards recognition that 
marital status creates at least a presumption of joint parentage for same-sex 
couples.  The same is true for children of opposite-sex, married parents.  
The difference—the “new illegitimacy”—lies in what happens when there 
is no marriage.  Does marriage become the exclusive way for same-sex co-
parents to establish parentage?  Is one penalty for “illegitimacy” the lack of 
a second legal parent?  This is a surprising result given the more general 
trend toward disentangling legitimacy and parentage, which is the subject 
of the next section. 
II.  THE DISENTANGLEMENT OF LEGITIMACY AND PARENTAGE: SOME 
LESSONS FROM THE LAW OF UNWED FATHERHOOD 
Joan and Peter Stanley raised three children together and cohabited on 
and off for almost two decades, but they never married.151  When Joan died 
in the late 1960s, the children were made wards of the state and placed with 
a court-appointed guardian.152  Peter, although he was the biological and 
social/psychological father of the children, and supported them throughout 
their lives, was given no rights as a legal parent under Illinois law.153  In 
                                                          
such as husband and wife used in any statute, rule, or other law must be construed to be 
gender neutral and applicable to spouses of the same sex.”). 
 149. D.C. CODE § 16-909(a)(1). 
 150. Id. § 16-909(b)(2). 
 151. In re Stanley, 256 N.E.2d 814, 814 (Ill. 1970). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
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fact, the law did not include him in the definition of parent at all; under the 
Juvenile Court Act, “‘Parents’ means the father and mother of a legitimate 
child, or the survivor of them, or the natural mother of an illegitimate child, 
and includes any adoptive parent.  It does not include a parent whose rights 
in respect of the minor have been terminated in any manner provided by 
law.”154  Because Peter was not considered a “parent,” his children’s fate 
upon the death of their mother—and only legal parent—was governed by 
another provision, which rendered them “dependent” on the state because 
they were “without a parent, guardian, or legal custodian.”155  He could 
have petitioned to be their custodian or guardian but, even if appointed, he 
would not have been considered their “parent,” with all the rights and 
obligations that come with that status. 
The Illinois law that denied legal parent status to Peter Stanley was not 
an anomaly.  It was part and parcel of a legal system that, by and large, tied 
parentage to legitimacy.  For legitimate children, the mother’s husband was 
presumed, often conclusively, to be the legal father.156  Marital status of the 
mother thus determined paternal parentage of the child.157 
For illegitimate children, marital status often determined (or precluded) 
parentage as well.  Although American law never took as harsh an 
approach to the status of illegitimate children as English law, most state 
laws differentiated between legitimate and illegitimate children when 
defining the parent-child relationship.158  Into the nineteenth century, a 
child born out of wedlock was filius nullius—the child of nobody.159  But, 
this rule was often overlooked to allow ties between illegitimate children 
and their mothers and her kin.  The formal rule gave way by the end of the 
nineteenth century to a less harsh rule that rendered them, by law, children 
of their mothers, but not their fathers.160  Like the 1967 version of the 
Illinois Juvenile Court Act, most state statutes in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century defined “parent” to include both mother and father 
                                                          
 154. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 701-14 (1967) (current version at 705 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 405/1-3 (West 2012) (removing the word legitimate)).  The provisions 
applicable to this case are cited and discussed in the opinion of the Illinois Supreme 
Court.  See In re Stanley, 256 N.E.2d 814, 815 (Ill. 1970). 
 155. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 702-05 (1967) (current version at 705 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 405/2-4 (West 2012)). 
 156. See LESLIE HARRIS ET AL., FAMILY LAW 887 (4th ed. 2010) (stating that in 
England, a husband was conclusively presumed to be the father of his wife’s children, 
unless he had been out of the kingdom for more than nine months). 
 157. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 120 (1989) (describing and 
upholding conclusive marital presumption of paternity). 
 158. See MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS: 
THE HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES (1994). 
 159. See id. at 24. 
 160. On this history, see John Witte, Jr., Ishmael’s Bane: The Sin and Crime of 
Illegitimacy Reconsidered, 5 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 327, 329-30 (2003). 
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in the case of legitimate children, but only the mother in the case of 
illegitimate children.  And for “legitimate” children who were actually 
fathered by someone other than the mother’s husband, their biological 
fathers did not have legal parent status either. 
There were obvious reasons to treat legitimacy and parentage as the 
same question.  For the most part, children of married parents were, in fact, 
sired by the mother’s husband.  Thus, even a conclusive marital 
presumption of paternity was tying the right man to the child most of the 
time.161  And, in the cases in which that was not true, the sex leading to the 
pregnancy was clearly verboten and not worthy of legal recognition.162  The 
interloping man was not likely to be a source of stability or support, and 
chasing after him could only damage the reputation of both mother and 
child; the law thus avoided chasing after him.163  Moreover, given the 
limitations of scientific knowledge, the real father could never be known 
for sure.  And the cost of inquiring might be the disruption and dissolution 
of the otherwise intact family unit.164 
Even though they were generally not defined as legal “parents,” fathers 
of out of wedlock children were not always legally free of obligation.  As 
states began to formalize the obligation of parents to support their children, 
many specifically obligated fathers to support illegitimate children.  By the 
1930s, every state had both a civil and criminal law requiring support for 
children.165  These laws varied as to whether mothers were also obligated to 
support children, and as to whether illegitimate children were included,  but 
a number of states did require fathers to support their out-of-wedlock 
children.166  Unwed mothers or local prosecutors could institute “bastardy” 
proceedings to prove paternity and obtain child support.167 
However, the financial obligations imposed on unwed biological fathers 
did not, as a general rule, come with parental rights.  It was this bifurcation 
of the rights and obligations of biological fatherhood that was the subject of 
several challenges in the 1970s.  In Stanley v. Illinois, the case challenging 
                                                          
 161. See Chris W. Altenbernd, Quasi-Marital Children: The Common Law’s Failure 
in Privette and Daniel Calls for Statutory Reform, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 219, 227-28 
(1999) (citing a 1940s study that found ten percent of children born to married women 
were conceived in adultery). 
 162. On the law’s confinement of legitimate sex to marriage, see generally 
GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 7. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Even when blood-typing evidence made clear that the husband was not the 
father of his wife’s child, courts were still reluctant to deny his legal parent status.  See, 
e.g., Prochnow v. Prochnow, 80 N.W.2d 278, 281 (Wis. 1957). 
 165. CHESTER G. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS, VOLUME IV: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY OF THE FAMILY LAW OF THE FORTY-EIGHT AMERICAN STATES, ALASKA, THE 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, AND HAWAII (TO JAN. 1, 1935) at 5 (1936). 
 166. See id. 
 167. See id. 
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Illinois’s refusal to recognize Peter Stanley as the legal father of his 
biological children, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the law 
excluding unwed fathers from the definition of “parent” violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.168  The Court relied first on 
the well-established principle that the right to “conceive and to raise one’s 
children” is “essential.”169 
A series of twentieth century cases had cemented the idea that parental 
rights had a constitutional basis.  In 1923, in Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court 
invalidated a Nebraska law banning instruction in any foreign language 
before ninth grade.170  The state had a right to try to “foster a homogeneous 
people with American ideals,” but it was not strong enough to override the 
parents’ right to have their children learn German.171  Such cultural 
decisions fell within a sphere of personal and family life that was protected 
from unnecessary governmental intrusion.  The Court’s ruling in Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters followed just two years later.172  Here, the Court 
invalidated an Oregon law that required children between ages eight and 
sixteen to attend public school.173  States could regulate the schools, even 
the curriculum, but they could not insist that children be educated only in 
government-run schools.174  A child was “not the mere creature of the 
State,” and parents possessed the right to make basic educational 
decisions.175  In the final piece of the trilogy, in 1944, the Court ruled, in 
Prince v. Massachusetts, that a child’s guardian—her aunt—could be 
convicted for allowing her niece to sell religious pamphlets on the street in 
violation of state labor law.176  Here, it was the child’s rights that were 
invoked, and they were not sufficiently strong to override the state’s 
interest in restricting child labor.177 
Despite the relatively early emphasis on parental rights in the arc of 
constitutional privacy jurisprudence, the Court had never—in the fifty 
years between Meyer and Stanley—applied them to unwed fathers.  In part, 
this was a function of demographics because the rate of non-marital 
childbearing remained minute into the 1950s, and, even then, began to rise 
only gradually.178  The illegitimacy rate was estimated at only 1.8% in 
                                                          
 168. 405 U.S. 645, 648 (1972). 
 169. Id. at 651 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). 
 170. 262 U.S. 390, 402-03 (1923). 
 171. Id. at 403. 
 172. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 173. Id. at 534-36. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 534. 
 176. 321 U.S. 158, 163 (1944). 
 177. Id. 
 178. See MASON, supra note 158, at 70. 
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1915; and only 3% in 1940.179  But the tides definitely had turned by the 
1980s: in 1985, 22% of all children were born to unmarried mothers; in 
1997, 32%; and by 2008, 40.6%.180  The rate for children of African-
American mothers, in 2008, was over 70%.181 
The strands of cause and effect are hard to discern, but the second half of 
the twentieth century saw the slow dismantling of a system that refused to 
acknowledge the legitimacy of sex outside of marriage, or the legitimacy of 
children that might result from such unions.  The developing right of 
privacy gave individuals control over contraception and abortion, and the 
Supreme Court explicitly extended such rights to unmarried couples.  Non-
marital cohabitation began to rise, and, eventually, states caught up to their 
residents by decriminalizing cohabitation and establishing the possibility of 
property-sharing rights between cohabitants.  Legislators and courts 
continued to favor and promote sex within marriage, and the birth of 
children into married families, but the formal efforts to ignore all other 
family forms began to subside. 
Amid this shift toward greater non-marital sex and childbearing, courts 
were forced to consider the validity of the many state laws that drew blunt, 
and sometimes harsh, distinctions between marital and non-marital 
children.  The Supreme Court waded into this issue in 1968, in Levy v. 
Lousiana.182  In that case, a law precluded a deceased mother’s five 
children from collecting damages for her wrongful death because they had 
been born out of wedlock.183  The Court struck down the law as a form of 
invidious discrimination given that “[l]egitimacy or illegitimacy of birth 
has no relation to the nature of the wrong allegedly inflicted on the 
mother.”184 Although the Court seemed to backpedal a bit in cases like 
Labine v. Vincent,185 it ruled in several other cases after Levy that states 
could not wantonly discriminate against illegitimate children.186  State law 
classifications on grounds of illegitimacy were entitled to heightened 
scrutiny at the same level as those based on gender or alienage.187  But even 
                                                          
 179. Id. 
 180. See Brady E. Hamilton et al., Births: Preliminary Data for 2008, NAT’L VITAL 
STAT. REP., Apr. 6, 2010, at 1, 6, tbl.1. 
 181. Id. 
 182. 391 U.S. 68 (1968). 
 183. Id. at 69-70. 
       184.      Id. at 72. 
 185. 401 U.S. 532 (1971). 
 186. See, e.g., Glona v. Am. Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968) 
(holding that a law that denies mothers of illegitimate children the right to recover for 
wrongful death violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution); Weber v. 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (invalidating law that denied 
workmen’s compensation recovery rights to unacknowledged illegitimate children was 
unconstitutional). 
 187. Id. at 74-76. 
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in those cases where differential treatment was allowed, courts did not 
question the existence of a legal mother-child relationship—just whether 
disparate benefits or burdens could be imposed based on the circumstances 
of a child’s birth.  Certain financial penalties were viewed as an acceptable 
method of deterring illegitimate births. 
As a consequence of these rulings, states were quite constrained after the 
1970s in any attempt to deter non-marital childbearing by punishing either 
the children or their mothers.  Thus, these cases ultimately stood for the 
proposition that mothers had the same legal relationship to their non-
marital children as to their marital children.  Once that was established, it 
became more difficult for the Supreme Court to uphold a system that 
denied any recognition to biological fathers, merely because they were born 
out of wedlock.  As the majority noted in Stanley, 
Nor has the law refused to recognize those family relationships 
unlegitimized by a marriage ceremony.  The Court has declared 
unconstitutional a state statute denying natural, but illegitimate, children 
a wrongful-death action for the death of their mother, emphasizing that 
such children cannot be denied the right of other children because 
familial bonds in such cases were often as warm, enduring, and 
important as those arising within a more formally organized family 
unit.188 
The state does not have unfettered discretion to draw the “legal lines [of 
parenthood] as it chooses.”189 
With respect to unwed fathers, the Court concluded that the categorical 
rule of non-recognition actually undermined the state’s identified 
interests.190  It aimed to protect “the moral, emotional, mental, and physical 
welfare of the minor and the best interests of the community” and to 
“strengthen the minor’s family ties whenever possible.”191  Yet, the law 
allowed children to be cut off from custodial, biological fathers based 
solely on marital status.  As the Court observed in Stanley, “the State 
registers no gain towards its declared goals when it separates children from 
the custody of fit parents.  Indeed, if Stanley is a fit father, the State spites 
its own articulated goals when it needlessly separates him from his 
family.”192  Thus, even if the state was right that “most unmarried fathers 
are unsuitable and neglectful parents,” some in this category are “wholly 
suited to have custody of their children.”193  Peter Stanley, in the Court’s 
view, was entitled to an opportunity to make his case as a father deserving 
                                                          
 188. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (internal citations omitted). 
 189. Id. at 652. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 652-53. 
 193. Id. at 654. 
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of custody.194  The denial of such an opportunity ran afoul of the emerging 
protection for illegitimate children, as well as the then-emerging, but now 
defunct irrebuttable presumption doctrine, which led the Court to strike 
down a series of laws with similar structure, in a variety of contexts, during 
the early 1970s.195  The Court compared Stanley’s plight to that of 
servicemen stationed in Texas who were irrebuttably presumed non-
residents for voting purposes and drivers in Georgia who were deprived of 
a license in some circumstances regardless of fault.196  In all three cases, the 
states were engaging in “procedure by presumption,” which, while 
“cheaper and easier than individualized determination,” came at the 
expense of individuals’ due process rights.  In the case of unwed fathers, 
the state’s reliance on an irrebuttable presumption “needlessly risks running 
roughshod over the important interests of both parent and child.”197  The 
Court, thus, invalidated the Illinois statute that categorically denied legal 
parent status to unwed fathers.198 
The Supreme Court revised the parental rights of unwed fathers in 
several cases over the two decades that followed Stanley.  It continued to 
insist that unwed fatherhood not be categorically ignored, but began to 
hammer out the degree to which states could still differentiate between the 
parental rights of unwed mothers and those of unwed fathers.  In Quilloin v. 
Walcott, the Court upheld a provision of the Georgia code that denied an 
unwed father the right to veto a proposed adoption.199  The child, born in 
1964, lived primarily with his mother, Ardell Walcott.200  She was never 
married to his father, Leon Quilloin but instead married another man in 
1967.201  After spending some time living with his grandmother following 
his mother’s marriage, the child moved in with his mother and stepfather in 
1969.202  In 1976, Ardell’s husband adopted her child and Leon moved to 
                                                          
 194. Id. 
 195. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 648-51 (1974) 
(invalidating various school district policies that irrebuttably presumed pregnant 
teachers unfit to work at a certain point in pregnancy, regardless of individual ability or 
medical condition).  On the demise of this doctrine, see John C. Jeffries, Jr. & Daryl L. 
Levinson, The Non-Retrogression Principle in Constitutional Law, 86 CAL. L. REV. 
1211, 1237–38 (1998) (noting that the Court “threw in the towel” on this doctrine, 
which was awkwardly used to remedy “substantive concerns” with “procedural 
restrictions”). 
 196. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 654-57 (discussing cases that found due process 
violations); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 543 (1971) (invalidating Georgia license 
suspension system on due process grounds); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 
(1965) (invalidating Texas voter qualification law on due process grounds). 
 197. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 656-57. 
 198. Id. at 657. 
 199. 434 U.S. 246, 255-56 (1978). 
 200. Id. at 247. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 247 n.1. 
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prevent it.203  Under the applicable Georgia law, however, an out-of-
wedlock child could be adopted based solely on the consent of his mother 
unless his father had “legitimated” the child according to a statutory 
procedure.204  Without legitimation, “the mother is the only recognized 
parent and is given exclusive authority to exercise all parental prerogatives, 
including the power to veto the adoption of a child.”205  Leon filed a 
petition to legitimate his son after adoption proceedings were commenced, 
but the trial court denied it on grounds that legitimation was not, at this 
point, in the best interests of the child.206 
Although this type of stark differentiation between unwed mothers and 
unwed fathers seemed to violate the principles elucidated in Stanley just six 
years earlier, the Court saw more substantial “countervailing interests” in 
this case.207  In Stanley, the choice was between the children’s remaining 
with their father or becoming wards of the state.208  Here, in contrast, 
recognition of the unwed father’s rights would stymie the mother’s effort to 
cement an existing stable family unit consisting of mother, child, and 
stepfather.  In Quilloin, the Court did not focus on the adequacy of the 
available procedures, as it had in Stanley, but on the substantive rights at 
stake.209  The Court acknowledged the strong constitutional protection for 
the parent-child relationship, even outside of marriage.210  Furthermore, the 
Court concluded that in this situation—involving an unwed father who 
never “had, or sought, actual or legal custody of his child” and an adoption 
that would “give full recognition to a family unit already in existence, a 
result desired by all concerned, except [the unwed father]”—the state was 
entitled to act solely on a finding of best interests, rather than the more 
onerous burden of proving the biological father unfit.211 
The Court in Quilloin seemed to backtrack a bit from its position in 
Stanley.  Two subsequent cases would provide further clues about the 
degree to which the parental rights of unwed fathers were constitutionally 
protected.  In Caban v. Mohammed, the following year, the Court came out 
strongly, again, in favor of the unwed father’s rights.212  Abdiel Caban had 
fathered two children during the years he lived with their mother.213  Later, 
                                                          
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 248-49. 
 205. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 206. Id. at 250. 
 207. Id. at 247-48. 
 208. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658-59 (1972). 
 209. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 247-48. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 255. 
 212. 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979). 
 213. Id. at 382. 
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the mother married, and wanted her new husband to adopt the children, 
which Abdiel refused.214  A provision of the New York Domestic Relations 
Law gave unmarried mothers, but not unmarried fathers, the right to 
consent to, or veto, the adoption of their child.215  Defending the statute, the 
State argued that “a natural mother” usually has a “closer relationship with 
her child . . . than a father does.”216  But the Court rejected this notion and 
insisted that unwed mothers and unwed fathers be treated equally.217 
The children in that case were four and six years old at the time of the 
proposed adoption and had spent time living with their biological father.218  
Given the Court’s reasoning in Quilloin, Abdiel could make a much 
stronger claim as a social father, which ultimately bolstered his claim to be 
treated as a legal father.  In Caban, however, the Court left open the 
question whether unwed fathers would have the same equal claim to 
infants, with whom they had not yet developed a social or emotional 
relationship.  Just four years later, though, the Court said no.  In Lehr v. 
Robertson, the Court held that unwed fathers—unlike unwed mothers—
were not entitled automatically to full parental rights.219  They had to assert 
paternity and take advantage of the opportunity to develop an attachment 
with their children.220  The case involved a baby, Jessica M., who was born 
out of wedlock to Lorraine Robertson and Jonathan Lehr.221  Lorraine 
married another man when Jessica was eight months old and petitioned for 
her new husband to adopt Jessica when she was two.222  After a favorable 
report from the social service agency, a court approved the stepfather 
adoption.223  The biological father, however, went to court, claiming that 
the adoption was invalid because he had not received notice of it prior to 
the proceeding.224 
At the time of Jessica’s birth, New York, like many other states, 
maintained a “putative father registry.”225  Unwed fathers can use this 
registry to notify the state of their intent to assert paternity over a child—or 
a potential child.226  Putative fathers are, like certain other categories of 
                                                          
 214. Id. at 383. 
 215. N.Y. DOM. REL. ACT § 111 (McKinney 1977), invalidated by Caban, 441 U.S. 
at 394. 
 216. Caban, 441 U.S. at 388. 
 217. Id. at 389. 
 218. Id. at 382, 389. 
 219. 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983). 
 220. Id. at 250. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. See, e.g., N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 372-c (McKinney 2011). 
 226. Id.; Lehr, 463 U.S. at 250-51. 
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men, such as those listed on a child’s birth certificate or living openly with 
a child, entitled to notice of adoption proceedings.227  Jonathan, however, 
met none of the criteria for notification.  He did not file a petition for 
visitation and paternity until after the adoption proceeding had begun, and 
the court simply ignored it.228  Jonathan argued that a putative father’s 
“actual or potential relationship” with his child was a “liberty” protected by 
the Constitution, and that the differential treatment of unwed mothers and 
fathers was an equal protection violation.229 
The Supreme Court upheld the New York law, ruling that Jonathan’s 
biological tie to Jessica was not enough to justify full constitutional 
protection of his parental rights.230  The Court distinguished between a 
“developed parent-child relationship,” and a potential one.231  The 
biological tie offers the natural father a unique opportunity to “develop a 
relationship” with the child, and if he “grasps that opportunity,” and 
accepts some “responsibility for the child’s future,” he may “enjoy the 
blessings of the parent-child relationship.”232  But if not, the Constitution 
will not “automatically compel a state to listen to his opinion of where the 
child’s best interests lie.”233 
Together, these rulings caused a dramatic shift in the treatment of unwed 
fathers under state law.  Although states could still treat unwed fathers 
differently from unwed mothers—something that is still true today—they 
could not altogether preclude their recognition as legal parents, as Illinois 
and other states had routinely done before Stanley.  The recognition of 
constitutional parental rights for unwed fathers spurred states to adopt new 
statutory schemes to identify legal fathers.  The modern scheme is best 
exemplified by the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), which was first 
proposed in 1973, and significantly amended in 2002.234  Under the UPA, a 
man is the “legal father” of a child if any one of a list of criteria has been 
met—the adjudication or acknowledgment of paternity, marriage to the 
mother, open and notorious acknowledgment of fatherhood, or clear and 
convincing evidence of paternity.235  The adoption of the UPA and similar 
statutes finalized a shift away from reliance on marital status as a proxy for 
biological fatherhood and towards recognition, and protection, of both 
                                                          
 227. Id. at 255. 
 228. Id. at 252. 
 229. Id. at 266-67. 
 230. Id. at 262. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT art. 7 prefatory n. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 67 (Supp. 
2011). 
 235. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 22-23 (Supp. 2011). 
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burgeoning and full-fledged father-child relationships. 
Before the 1970s and the UPA, parental rights and parental obligations 
did not necessarily coincide—at least not completely.236  For legitimate 
children, they did.  But for illegitimate children, a child might have a 
recognized relationship with his mother, but still be treated differently than 
his legitimate siblings.  And he might have no recognized parent-child 
relationship with his father, and yet be entitled to some rights of support, 
inheritance, and so on.  But the constitutional recognition of protection 
against illegitimacy discrimination and in favor of the parental rights of 
unwed fathers changed the landscape dramatically.237  Even the marital 
presumption of paternity began to weaken, with most states shifting away, 
at least, from irrebuttable presumptions.  Taken together, these 
developments gave rise to a new statutory approach that untethered 
legitimacy and parentage, on the one hand, and unified the meaning of 
legal parent status on the other.  Legal parents had the same rights and 
obligations regardless of whether the children were born in or out of 
wedlock; any biological parent could become a recognized legal parent, as 
long as the right steps were taken. 
III.  THE UNWED FATHER V. THE LESBIAN CO-MOTHER: COMMON 
GROUND? 
What do unwed fathers have to do with lesbian co-mothers?  Despite the 
clear trend to disentangle legitimacy and parentage for children of 
heterosexual couples,—both married and unmarried—we see in some 
recent decisions the re-emergence of such ties in the context of lesbian co-
parents.238  Under these cases, without a second-parent adoption, children 
of lesbian co-parents have two legal parents only if the two women are 
married or in a civil union together.  Otherwise, the biological or adoptive 
mother is the only legal parent.  Legitimacy and parentage thus converge.  
For lesbian co-parents who have entered into a civil union or a same-sex 
marriage, a ruling like Debra H. will provide greater protection for their 
parenting rights in the event that the adult relationship dissolves via divorce 
                                                          
 236. See generally Harry D. Krause, Bringing the Bastard into the Great Society—A 
Proposed Uniform Act on Legitimacy, 44 TEX. L. REV. 829 (1966) (discussing the 
problems of determining legal status for illegitimate children due to the lack of 
uniformity among state laws and uneven interpretation of common law principles by 
the courts). 
 237. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1978) (‘‘A State may not invidiously 
discriminate against illegitimate children by denying them substantial benefits accorded 
children generally.  We therefore hold that once a State posits a judicially enforceable 
right on behalf of children to needed support from their natural fathers there is no 
constitutionally sufficient justification for denying such an essential right to a child 
simply because its natural father has not married its mother.’’). 
 238. See, e.g., Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 184 (N.Y. 2010) (concluding 
that a civil union gives right to assert parentage). 
32
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 11
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol20/iss3/11
  
2012] TYING PARENTAGE TO MARITAL STATUS 703 
or death.  It may, in fact, provide too much protection, given how difficult 
it can be to dissolve same-sex relationships, especially civil unions.239  
Conceivably, civil union partners or same-sex spouses could make claims 
for visitation (or more) with respect to children who are born to a partner 
long after the actual relationship has broken down, yet while the parents are 
still technically in the union.240  Or, biological mothers could make claims 
for child support against ex-partners who are not co-parents in any social 
sense, but are remain legally tied through a marriage or civil union. 
But the more troubling consequence of re-entangling marital status and 
parentage is in its potential to restrict co-parents’ rights, rather than to 
expand them.  To the extent formal recognition of an adult relationship is 
deemed a prerequisite for parentage when there is no second-parent 
adoption, children of unmarried same-sex parents will be deprived of a 
second legal parent by sole reason of marital status.  This is the approach 
dictated by Debra H.: the child has two legal parents only because the two 
women had established a civil union in another state before the birth.241  
This is a somewhat ironic rule in a state that did not itself allow the 
celebration of same-sex marriages or civil unions at that time.242  The 
court’s reaffirmation of Alison D., and continuing rejection of de facto 
parentage, mean that the biological mother alone can decide whether to 
permit her female partner to adopt, whether to enter into a marriage or civil 
                                                          
 239. The dissolution problem arises because (1) states impose a residency 
requirement for divorce, but not marriage or civil union; and (2) most states that do not 
allow the celebration of same-sex marriages or civil unions also do not give effect to 
them, even for the limited purpose of granting a divorce.  Thus, a gay or lesbian couple 
that marries or enters a civil union in one state may be stuck together, legally speaking, 
if they reside in a state that will not recognize their relationship.  See, e.g., Rosengarten 
v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002) (refusing to dissolve Vermont civil 
union); Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.3d 956 (R.I. 2007) (refusing to dissolve same-
sex marriage contracted in Massachusetts); In re J.B. and H.B., 326 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 2010) (refusing to grant divorce to two men who had married while living in 
Massachusetts and then moved to Texas).  On this issue, see generally, Joanna L. 
Grossman, Resurrecting Comity: Revisiting the Problem of Non-Uniform Marriage 
Laws, 84 OR. L. REV. 433, 484-86 (2005); Joanna L. Grossman, Fear and Loathing in 
Massachusetts: Same-Sex Marriage and Some Lessons from the History of Marriage 
and Divorce, 14 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 87 (2004). 
 240. Indeed, Janice R. had a second child, also conceived via artificial insemination, 
while still in a civil union with Debra H., though their social relationship had ended.  
The child is not mentioned beyond a footnote in the Debra H. ruling, which simply 
states that “[a]fter Janice R. and Debra H. broke up, Janice R. conceived another child 
through artificial insemination.  Debra H. does not claim to have any developed any 
relationship with this child, who was born after she brought this action.”  930 N.E.2d at 
187.  The question why these two children, both born during the civil union, are not 
subject to the same rule of joint parentage is troubling. 
 241. Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 197. 
 242. See Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 1 (N.Y. 2006) (upholding the state’s 
ban on same-sex marriage against a state constitutional challenge).  On June 24, 2011, 
the New York legislature enacted a marriage equality bill to allow same-sex marriage.  
See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 10-a, 10-b (McKinney 2011).  The first gay marriages 
were celebrated thirty days later. 
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union that might result in joint parentage, or whether to consent to shared 
custody or visitation after a break-up.  Yet the couple’s decision as to 
which partner will bear the child may rest on considerations—such as 
fertility, age, and health—that have nothing to do with which of the two 
would be a better parent, let alone the only parent.  It seems likely that the 
overwhelming majority of couples, when making the decision to go 
forward with childbearing, would agree that if they broke up, custody 
should be shared between them, regardless of legal formalities.  Should this 
initial sentiment be honored by the law?  Or should the biological mother’s 
post-breakup desire to cut off all contact with the non-biological mother be 
honored in the absence of a formal tie like adoption or marriage? 
How one answers these questions is a function of one’s conception of 
parentage: what gives rise to parental status and the rights and obligations 
that flow from it?  There is no exact parallel to this situation in the world of 
heterosexual childbearing.  Under existing jurisprudence, an unwed father 
has constitutionally protected parental rights based on biology plus the 
efforts he makes to develop a filial relationship from the biological 
connection.243 
Biology does not make a man a legal father, but it gives him the right to 
become one.  A man who fails to grasp the opportunity to develop a 
functional parent-child can forfeit his parentage, but a child’s mother 
cannot unilaterally extinguish it.  This principle was tested, among other 
ways, in a cluster of high-profile adoption cases in the 1990s.244  In the 
“Baby Richard” case, the birth mother told the biological father, falsely, 
that the baby had died.245  Then she quietly consented to the baby’s 
adoption, without the knowledge or consent of the biological father.246  He 
successfully challenged the adoption, after it had become final, and 
Richard, age three, was returned to a father he has never met.247 
“Baby Jessica” faced a similar fate.248  Her unmarried mother named the 
wrong man on the birth certificate, perhaps to lead the real biological father 
astray, and then surrendered her baby for adoption.249  But, the biological 
father eventually discovered the truth and successfully challenged the 
adoption.250  Jessica, age two and a half, was returned to her biological 
                                                          
 243. See supra text accompanying notes 212-38. 
 244. See, e.g., In re Petition of Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1995). 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. at 328. 
 247. Id. at 340. 
 248. In re B.C.G., 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992); In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 
N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993). 
 249. In re B.C.G., 496 N.W.2d at 241. 
 250. Id. 
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father, amid a media circus.251  The lesson of these cases was that an unwed 
father’s rights cannot be extinguished at the mother’s whim, even if the 
decision she makes is in the child’s best interests.  The unwed father has 
rights until he forfeits them—by consenting to adoption, by surrendering 
them in some other form, by committing abuse or neglect that justifies 
involuntary termination, or simply by failing to grasp the opportunity to 
build a relationship with the child.252  Divorcing mothers may object to 
visitation by their ex-husbands.  Unwed mothers may object to sharing 
custody or having their adoption plan vetoed by the child’s father.  But 
once recognized as legal fathers, these men, whether married to their 
children’s mothers or not, have constitutional parental rights equal to those 
of the legal mother.  Neither parent has a superior constitutional claim to 
control the child’s time or relationships. 
On what basis might we say that the biological mother is similarly 
constrained in her ability to sever ties unilaterally between her child and a 
lesbian co-parent?  We have to go back to first principles of parentage.  As 
we have seen, the act of giving birth—absent an enforceable surrogacy 
agreement—gives rise to legal motherhood; this is the rule across the 
country.253  Thus, regardless of how a biological mother acts once the child 
is born, she is the legal mother with rights that cannot be taken away 
without sufficient cause—i.e., proof of abuse or neglect.  Her parental 
rights are broad and include the right to “care, control, and custody” of her 
child.254  This includes, as a general matter, the right to decide with whom 
her child develops relationship and the right to refuse third-party demands 
for custody of or visitation with the child, including those coming from 
grandparents and other relatives.255  A legal father, in contrast, would stand 
on equal constitutional footing with the biological mother. 
But what is the status of a lesbian co-parent without an obvious basis for 
parentage like adoption, or less obvious one like a marital presumption of 
“paternity?”  She does not have the biological tie that would allow her to 
invoke the constitutional parental rights of an unwed father, nor any other 
basis in current law to demand constitutional protection for her right to 
parent a non-adopted, non-biological child.256  To the contrary, 
                                                          
 251. See Isabel Wilkerson, Michigan Couple Is Ordered to Return Girl, 2, to 
Biological Parents, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1993, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/03/31/us/michigan-couple-is-ordered-to-return-girl-2-
to-biological-parents.html. 
 252. See generally In re Petition of Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1995) (discussing 
factors courts consider when determining if biological father has a legal right to child). 
 253. See, e.g, CAL. FAM. CODE § 7610 (West 2012). 
 254. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000). 
           255.      See id. 
 256. That is not to say that she should not have any protected parental rights at the 
outset.  Parentage based on intent is beginning to get some traction. 
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constitutional protection for the rights of parents versus non-parents, 
elucidated in Troxel v. Granville, militate against her claims vis-à-vis the 
child.257 Her rights thus depend on whether a state chooses to elevate her 
status above other third parties – to assign her parentage or quasi-parentage 
based on intent, function, consent of the natural mother, or some 
combination of criteria. 
In the jurisdictions in which lesbian co-parents have successfully gained 
recognition without the benefit of adoption or marriage, we see a range of 
approaches to reconciling the rights of the biological mother with the 
claims of a lesbian co-parent.  The discussion here will highlight and 
contrast several existing approaches, while leaving a discussion of the best 
or most justifiable approach for another day.  As discussed in Section I, the 
states that recognize de facto parentage have drawn on some combination 
of factors, generally including consent of the biological mother to the 
creation and development of the de facto parenting relationship and a 
sustained period of actual parenting by the lesbian co-parent.  This 
approach puts great stock in the act of parenting, but only if the legal 
mother has first consented.  The de facto parent cases take the view that a 
legal parent can consent to share the parental rights the Constitution grants 
her by inviting another adult into a child’s life and encouraging the 
development of a functional parent-child relationship.  Although courts 
emphasize different factors, all rulings are predicated on at least some 
notion of consent by the biological mother to parenting by her partner.  As 
the court noted in In re H.S.H.-K, “[t]hrough consent, a biological or 
adoptive parent exercises his or her constitutional right of parental 
autonomy to allow another adult to develop a parent-like relationship with 
the child.” 258  Adopting the same test in a lesbian co-parent case, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court emphasized that: 
Prong one [of the H.S.H.-K test] is critical because it makes the 
biological or adoptive parent a participant in the creation of the 
psychological parent’s relationship with the child.  Without such a 
requirement, a paid nanny or babysitter could theoretically qualify for 
parental status.  To avoid that result . . . the legal parent must have 
fostered the formation of the parental relationship between the third party 
and the child.  By fostered is meant that the legal parent ceded over to 
the third party a measure of parental authority and autonomy and granted 
to that third party rights and duties vis-à-vis the child that the third 
party’s status would not otherwise warrant.259 
In that court’s view, 
                                                          
           257.      530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000). 
 258. In re H.S.H.-K, 533 N.W.2d 419, 436 n.40 (Wis. 1995). 
 259. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 552 (N.J. 2000). 
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[the] requirement of cooperation by the legal parent is critical because it 
places control within his or her hands.  That parent has the absolute 
ability to maintain a zone of autonomous privacy for herself and her 
child.  However, if she wishes to maintain that zone of privacy she 
cannot invite a third party to function as a parent to her child and cannot 
cede over to that third party parental authority the exercise of which may 
create a profound bond with the child.260 
Once that bond has been willingly created and fostered, the legal parent 
loses the right to unilaterally terminate the relationship between the 
psychological parent and the child.  “In practice,” the court continued, “that 
may mean protecting those relationships despite the later, contrary wishes 
of the legal parent in order to advance the interests of the child.”261 
De facto parentage, however, is not the only approach to recognition of 
lesbian co-parents rights.  California has taken the notion of co-parentage 
one step further, by applying the parentage rules designed for fathers to co-
mothers to the extent practicable.  In 2005, the California Supreme Court 
issued three decisions on the same day that solidified both the rights and 
obligations of lesbian co-parents.262  Confronting questions of child support 
and parental status, the court held, in essence, that a lesbian partner who 
agrees, with her partner, to bring a child into the world, but is not the 
child’s biological mother, has the same rights and obligations as other legal 
parents.263  Although the law in many jurisdictions has been developed 
piecemeal—with courts answering parentage questions case-by-case—the 
California trilogy was striking for its attempt to hammer out a general 
framework for courts’ treatment of lesbian parents and their children.  And 
these were the first opinions in the country to accord full parental status to 
two mothers without the benefit of a second-parent adoption, which 
California already allowed.264 
In the first case, Elisa B. v. Superior Court, a woman named Emily was 
artificially inseminated with sperm from an anonymous donor and gave 
birth to twins.265  Her partner, Elisa, had become pregnant the same way, 
with sperm from the same donor, a few months earlier.266  In every respect, 
Emily and Elisa became parents together.267  They had lived for several 
years prior as partners, had commingled their lives in financial and other 
                                                          
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005); K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 
673 (Cal. 2005); Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690 (Cal. 2005). 
 263. See Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 670; K.M., 117 P.3d at 681; Kristine H., 117 P.3d at 
693. 
 264. See Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554 (Cal. 2003). 
 265. Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 663. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
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ways, and, together, had decided to have children.268  They were present for 
each other’s inseminations, prenatal medical appointments, and 
deliveries.269  Emily and Elisa each breast-fed all three children and they 
identified themselves, in many contexts, as co-parents.270  Emily stayed 
home with the children, one of whom had Down’s Syndrome, and Elisa 
fully supported the five-member family.271  However, neither Emily nor 
Elisa ever adopted the other’s biological children.272 
Emily and Elisa separated when the children were toddlers.273  While 
Elisa continued to support Emily and the twins for sometime thereafter, she 
eventually ceased doing so.274  Emily then sued for child support, and, in 
response, Elisa denied being the “parent” of Emily’s twins; her position 
was that she was a mother only to the child to whom she had actually given 
birth.275  In California, like other states, there is a bulky statutory and 
regulatory structure in place to ensure adequate support for children.276  As 
a general matter, parents, regardless of gender, have a legal duty to support 
their children.  What made the outcome of Emily’s petition uncertain, 
however, is the requirement that an individual be considered a “parent” 
before being saddled with child support payments. 
No one doubted that Emily was the mother of the twins to whom she had 
given birth.  Consistent with California law, however, could Elisa—who 
had not adopted them—also be considered their mother?  Or, put another 
way, can a child have two legal mothers?  The California court, 
unanimously, said yes.277  Parentage in California, as in many other states, 
is governed by the UPA, which defines the “parent and child relationship” 
for legal purposes.278  Mothers are considered parents if they have given 
birth to, or legally adopted, a child.279  Since Elisa had not legally adopted 
the twins, she could not, under this definition, be their mother.  But, could 
she be something like a female father?  The California UPA directs that the 
provisions related to the establishment of a father-child relationship should 
be applied to mother and child relationships as well, “insofar as 
practicable.”280  Legal fatherhood is more complicated than motherhood: a 
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man is presumed to be the father if he is the husband of the child’s mother, 
if he voluntarily admits paternity, or if “receives the child into his home 
and openly holds out the child as his natural child.”281  Elisa did not marry 
Emily, but perhaps that was because she could not: gay marriage was not 
legal in California then.282  But arguably, by co-parenting the twins, Elisa 
in some sense held them out as her own.  Also, the structure of Elisa and 
Emily’s arrangement—both opting to have children from the same male 
sperm donor—possibly bespeaks an intention to treat the children as part of 
the family, regardless of which partner gave birth to which child. 
In deciding the case, the California Supreme Court had to grapple with 
one of its own precedents, Johnson v. Calvert.283  There, the Court had 
addressed a triangle involving a husband who provided the sperm, his wife 
who provided the egg, and a surrogate who carried the child.  It held that a 
child can have “only one natural mother.”284  That mother, the court 
decided, was the child’s “biological” mother—the wife, rather than the 
surrogate.285  It preferred that option to the solution of leaving the child 
with three legal parents.  In Elisa B., the court’s words came back to haunt 
it.  Could a child have more than one mother?  Here, there were only two 
potential parents of the twins: Elisa and Emily.  The UPA and similar laws 
all agree that an anonymous sperm donor has no legal relationship to any 
resulting child.286  Emily is clearly a “natural mother” to the twins under 
California law; but, the court concluded, Elisa is also their parent.287 
By analogy, the court applied one of the “presumed father” categories to 
Elisa.288  She had, indeed, openly received the twins in her home and held 
them as her own “natural” children.289  She had claimed them as 
dependents on her tax returns, told her employer she was the mother of 
triplets, and consented to the use of a hyphenated surname that combined 
the two women’s names.290  Along with Emily, Elisa even breastfed the 
                                                          
 281. Id. § 7611. 
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twins, which is a greater physical connection than most presumed fathers 
could establish.291  Prior California cases had established that a person 
could be considered a “natural” parent even when there was admittedly no 
biological connection between parent and child, so Elisa’s lack of a 
biological relationship to the twins was not an insurmountable obstacle to 
the court’s considering her their “natural mother.”292  Because Elisa had 
“actively consented to, and participated in, the artificial insemination of her 
partner with the understanding that the resulting child or children would be 
raised by Emily and her as co-parents, and they did act as co-parents for a 
substantial period of time,” the court refused to let Elisa, who wanted to 
deny parenthood, rebut the presumption of legal parenthood.293  Thus, just 
as men who are not the biological father are sometimes held, nonetheless, 
to be the legal father of a child, Elisa was held to be a legal parent of 
Emily’s twins.294  This is the same result that would have been reached had 
the two women been registered as domestic partners under California law, 
which grants domestic partners all the rights and obligations of spouses, 
including rights with respect to a partner’s child.295 
The second case, K.M. v. E.G., also involved two women claiming to be 
mothers of the same child.296  K.M. donated eggs to her registered domestic 
partner, E.G., to use for in vitro fertilization (IVF).297  But, at the time of 
the egg donation, K.M. signed a standard form relinquishing any claim to 
any resulting offspring.298  However, she later wished to be considered the 
child’s mother, over the objection of E.G.299  Whether both women 
intended to be “parents” of these twins, is less clear than in Elisa B.  K.M. 
claimed that they planned to raise any children together, while E.G. stated 
that she always intended to be a “single parent” with a “supportive” 
partner.300  They raised the children together for five years, with 
intertwined lives, before splitting up in 2001.301 
The legal posture of this case was different than in Elisa B.  Here, K.M., 
unlike Elisa, had a biological connection to the twins.  She was, after all, 
the egg donor.  The question, then, was whether the provision stating that a 
man who donates sperm to a woman other than his wife is not the father of 
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any resulting child, should apply to her—or, alternatively, if the form 
relinquishing parental rights is binding.  In another landmark decision, the 
California Supreme Court said no: since K.M. supplied eggs to her lesbian 
partner “in order to produce children who would be raised in their joint 
home,” the sperm-donor-provision could not be used to block her status as 
a parent.302  The court could have relied, as the appellate court did, on the 
“insofar as practicable” language of the UPA and treated K.M. like an 
anonymous sperm donor with no parental rights.303  But, since those 
provisions are designed to facilitate anonymous sperm donation—a socially 
useful practice that permits infertile or single women to conceive 
children—the court found them inapplicable.304  Men might be reluctant to 
donate sperm if parental rights or obligations might arise from the act.  But 
the situation for K.M. and E.G. was obviously different, and the California 
Supreme Court agreed that the facts did not present a “true” case of “egg 
donation.”305  K.M. did not intend, after all, to give away her eggs, never to 
be seen again, as anonymous sperm—and, presumably, some anonymous 
egg—donors do.  She intended, rather, that the eggs be used to produce 
children that would live with her.  It was thus reasonable, under the UPA, 
to grant both her and E.G. parental status with respect to the twins.306 
Given the decision in Elisa B., the California court was not barred from 
declaring two women to be mothers of the same children.  K.M. is the 
children’s mother, the court concluded, because she provided the eggs from 
which they were produced, and E.G. is their mother because she gave birth 
to them.307 
In the third case, Kristine H. v. Lisa R., the court ruled that a woman, 
who had stipulated that her partner was the “second mother/parent” to her 
impending child, could not later deny that characterization.308  While 
Kristine was pregnant, she and Lisa filed a “Complaint to Declare 
Existence of Parental Rights” with the superior court.309  They took this 
step because state law would permit Lisa to be listed on the child’s birth 
certificate—in the space provided for “father”—only if her parental status 
had been legally recognized first.310  With stipulations from both Lisa and 
Kristine that Lisa would be the “other parent” of Kristine’s baby, the court 
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issued the requested judgment.311  As a result, both women were listed on 
the birth certificate, and the baby was given a surname that combined the 
two women’s last names.312  Two years later, the women separated.313  Lisa 
sought custody of the child, and Kristine asked that the court vacate the 
stipulated judgment of Lisa’s parental status.314  While this case presented 
some of the same questions as the two other cases decided that day, the 
court decided it on purely procedural grounds.  The court ruled that 
estoppel principles prevented Kristine from changing her mind about Lisa’s 
rights and asserting different facts in a later legal proceeding.315  Equitable 
estoppel is generally invoked only to avoid harm; here, the reversal of her 
position on the rights of the co-parent would presumably have hurt not only 
Lisa, but the child as well, given the two years of social parenting.316 
Application of the estoppel doctrine permitted the California court to 
dodge what might have been a tricky question: whether individuals can 
create parental status by agreement, if the provisions of the UPA do not 
otherwise establish it.  Even with the concurrent decisions in Elisa B. and 
K.M., it is not clear how the court might have ruled on this issue.  
Renouncing parental status by agreement is typically invalid, except in the 
special case of anonymous sperm donors, for it conflicts with exclusive 
state law definitions of parenthood, and because a third party, the child, is 
involved.  But, creating parental status by agreement might be a different 
matter.  Unlike an agreed renunciation, the agreed creation of parental 
status might inspire the kind of reliance the law arguably should be 
reluctant to disrupt: emotional reliance by all parties concerned, including, 
when the child is aware of the agreement. 
Parentage by agreement is an approach that the Ohio Supreme Court 
seems to countenance.  In a recent case, In re Mullen, the court ruled 
against a lesbian co-parent’s claim for shared custody of a child whose 
birth and rearing she had been involved with at every step.317  Three years 
into their relationship, Kelly Mullen and Michele Hobbs decided they 
would like to have a child.318  A friend donated sperm, and Mullen became 
pregnant via IVF.319  Mullen and the donor signed an agreement providing 
that while his name would be listed on the birth certificate, he would not 
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retain any parental rights or be obligated to support the child.320  Hobbs, 
meanwhile, shared the expense of IVF.321  Mullen executed a will and a 
health-care proxy in which she gave Hobbs the authority to act as Mullen’s 
agent with respect to the child.322  In these documents, Mullen stated that 
she was the legal parent, but that Hobbs was her “child’s co-parent in every 
way.”323  Eventually, the relationship between Hobbs and Mullen broke 
down, and the sperm donor became involved in the child’s life.324 
Hobbs filed a complaint for shared custody, alleging that Mullen had 
“created a contract through her conduct with Hobbs to permanently share 
legal custody of the child.”325  The juvenile court ruled against Hobbs’s 
claim, concluding that Mullen was a legal parent by virtue of biology; the 
sperm donor was a biological father with some potential to gain parental 
rights; and Hobbs was a non-parent, “despite her active role in raising and 
caring for the child.”326  The appellate court affirmed this decision.327 
The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the ruling that denied Hobbs any 
rights as a parent or co-parent.328  But, in doing so, it made clear that a 
lesbian co-parent could acquire parenting rights by virtue of an enforceable 
shared-parenting agreement.329  The court confirmed that a “parent may 
voluntarily share with a non-parent the care, custody, and control of his or 
her child through a valid shared-parenting agreement,” the essence of 
which “is the purposeful relinquishment of some portion of the parent’s 
right to exclusive custody of the child.”330  Such an agreement “recognizes 
the general principle that a parent can grant custody rights to a non-parent 
and will be bound by the agreement.”331  A valid shared-parenting 
agreement is enforceable as long as the co-parent is a “proper person to 
assume the care, training, and education of the child,” and the agreement 
serves the child’s best interests.332  Thus, the problem for Hobbs was not 
that she could not have acquired custodial rights under law, but that, on the 
facts, she did not show sufficient evidence of a shared parenting agreement.  
Although Mullen had granted her some rights and responsibilities through 
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various legal documents, those rights, the court found, were both revocable 
and revoked.333  There was also evidence to suggest that Mullen had 
“consistently refused to enter into or sign any formal shared-custody 
agreement when presented with the opportunity to do so.”334  Although this 
approach disregards de facto parenting in many cases, the court felt that 
“the best way to safeguard both a parent’s and a non-parent’s rights with 
respect to children is to agree in writing as to how custody is to be shared, 
the manner in which it is shared, and the degree to which it may be 
revocable or permanent . . . .”335 
A series of cases in North Carolina take a similar approach, by allowing 
a third party sometimes to gain the right to share custody even without 
being recognized as a legal parent.336  The question presented under North 
Carolina law, when a third party requests custody or visitation, is whether 
the biological mother has acted inconsistently with paramount status vis-à-
vis a child.337 
In Boseman v. Jarrell, Julia Boseman and Melissa Jarrell had been in a 
committed intimate relationship for several years when they decided to 
start a family.338  They decided that Jarrell would bear the child, but both 
women were involved in every stage of the process.339  Julia helped select a 
sperm donor, accompanied Melissa on doctor visits, read and sang to the 
child in utero, and was present for the delivery of the baby in October, 
2002.340  They gave the child a hyphenated last name using both of their 
own surnames, held a baptism at which they were publicly presented as the 
child’s “parents,” and functioned, for the first several years, as equal co-
parents.341  In 2004, the parties sought an adoption that would allow Julia to 
adopt the child, while allowing Melissa to retain her full legal rights as a 
parent.342  Although the North Carolina Code did not expressly allow for a 
so-called “second-parent adoption” such as this one, the petition was 
granted by a trial court judge in Durham County in 2005.343  The adoption 
decree explicitly stated that it would create a full parent-child relationship 
between Julia and the child, while “not sever[ing] the relationship of parent 
                                                          
 333. Id. 
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and child between the individual adopted and that individual’s biological 
mother.”344  The decree, in other words, gave the child two legal mothers—
one biological, and one adoptive.345  The Division of Social Services, 
however, refused to “index” the adoption.346  The court instructed the clerk 
to ignore a statutory requirement that the decree be transmitted to the 
Division and ordered it, instead, to “securely maintain this file in the 
clerk’s office.”347 
The following year, the two women terminated their relationship.348  
Julia continued to provide the bulk of the financial support for both Melissa 
and the child.349  But Melissa soon reduced Julia’s contact with the child, 
despite admitting that Julia was a “very good parent” and had a loving 
relationship with the child.350  When Julia filed a complaint seeking 
custody, Melissa attacked the validity of the adoption decree, arguing that 
the court did not have the power under North Carolina law to grant it in the 
first instance.351  If the adoption decree was void, she argued, Julia was not 
a “parent” and thus could not seek custody.352  The trial court held, 
however, that it did not have the power to invalidate an adoption granted by 
a sister court.353  Thus, Julia, like Melissa, was a legal parent and entitled to 
a determination of custody based on the best interests of the child—with 
neither mother having a presumptive right of custody.  The Court of 
Appeals affirmed all aspects of this ruling.354 
On appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court, this case took a 
surprising turn.  The court accepted Melissa’s argument that the adoption 
was void ab initio.355  Because adoption law is entirely statutory, the court 
ruled that the trial court did not have the power to grant an adoption that 
was not authorized by the code.356  The code allows for a traditional 
adoption, in which a child is placed, privately or through an agency, with 
an adoptive parent or parents.357  The adoption severs the relationship with 
the biological parents and replaces it with a full legal relationship with the 
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adoptive parent(s).358  The code also allows for a stepparent adoption, 
which allows a stepparent, with the consent of the spouse-parent, to adopt a 
stepchild.359  This type of adoption has no effect on the legal relationship 
between the biological spouse-parent and child.360  But because Julia and 
Melissa were not married—and, even if they were, a same-sex marriage 
cannot be recognized in North Carolina361—Julia could not pursue a 
stepparent adoption, and the code does not seem to contemplate for any 
other type of second-parent adoption.  In the view of the North Carolina 
Supreme Court, the trial court attempted to authorize a modified private 
placement adoption—one that would add an additional parent, without 
taking away an existing one—that the code does not allow.362  The 
requirements that the consenting parent acknowledge the effect of an 
adoption on her rights and obligations and that the decree “must sever the 
former parent-child relationship” are not waivable by a court.363  And, 
because the court did not have authority to grant the adoption sought by the 
petitioner, it did not have jurisdiction to consider the matter at all.364  It thus 
declared the adoption void ab initio.365  Putting aside the obvious problems 
with invalidating an adoption six years after the fact, and casting doubt on 
any number of other second-parent adoptions granted by North Carolina 
courts,366 the invalidation of the adoption decree returned Julia to the status 
of “non-parent.” 
Despite invalidating the second-parent adoption, the North Carolina 
Supreme Court felt that this was not a typical parent versus non-parent 
dispute.  Although this child has only one legal parent, Melissa had, by 
inviting Julia to function as a parent on a non-temporary basis, “acted 
inconsistent with her constitutionally protected, paramount parental 
status.”367  The court reasoned that a parent could lose out on the absolute 
nature of parental rights not only by demonstrating unfitness—and risking 
involuntary termination of parental rights—but also through a “voluntary 
grant of non-parent custody.”368  In a prior case, Price v. Howard, the court 
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focused on a mother’s decision to tell a man, untruthfully, that he was the 
biological father of her child and then to create a family unit that included 
him and “allow that family unit to flourish in a relationship of love and 
duty with no expectations that it would be terminated.”369  She had also 
relinquished complete custody of the child to him for a period of time.370  
Under those circumstances, the court refused to defer to the legal mother’s 
near-absolute right to determine the care and custody of her child.371  It 
treated the resulting custody dispute between the mother and the de facto 
father as one between parents, which are governed by a simple “best 
interests” standard.372  The court ruled similarly in Mason v. Dwinnell, in 
which a lesbian couple decided together to start a family and “intentionally 
took steps to identify the [non-biological mother] as a parent of the 
child.”373  Although the legal mother had never relinquished custody to her 
partner, the two women had been relatively equal co-parents.374  That the 
biological mother chose to share indefinitely both decision-making 
authority, evidenced in part by execution of a parenting agreement, and 
custody with the non-biological co-parent meant that she had relinquished 
her paramount parental status.375  According to the court, “the gravamen of 
‘inconsistent acts’ is the volitional acts of the legal parent that relinquish 
otherwise exclusive parental authority to a third party.”376 
In Boseman, the court found that these same factors—consent for a third 
party to be treated as a parent with no indication of temporary status—were 
established by clear and convincing evidence.377  Melissa “intentionally and 
voluntarily created a family unit in which [Julia] was intended to act—and 
acted—as a parent,” with “no expectation that this family unit was only 
temporary.”378  Melissa “acted inconsistently with her paramount parental 
status,” and thus was entitled to no heavy thumb on the scale in a custody 
dispute with Julia.379  Julia, who had been invited to act as a parent 
indefinitely, was entitled to joint custody of the child.380  Although 
Boseman is unusual in granting shared custody to someone formally 
labeled a non-parent, it treats consent to share parental rights in much the 
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same manner as do courts that recognize de facto parentage. 
Let’s return to Debra H., in which the New York Court of Appeals ruled 
that a lesbian co-parent could not be recognized as a de facto or any other 
kind of parent on the basis that the biological mother had consented to the 
co-parent’s assumption of a parent-like role.381  The lesbian co-parent 
could, however, be recognized as a legal parent because she had entered 
into a civil union with the biological mother.  Why?  When we indulge a 
marital presumption of paternity, marriage is largely a proxy for biology.  
In the absence of contradictory evidence, we assume that married women 
are having sex only with their husbands and, thus, that any children 
conceived are genetically related to them.  This was particularly 
appropriate before the late twentieth century, when legitimate sex was 
confined to marriage.  Most children of married women were sired by the 
husband; and, for the ones that were the product of adultery, the law had no 
desire to provide a mechanism for proving it or to destabilize the family 
unit that might otherwise survive the indiscretion.382 
In the context of two women who together plan for the conception and 
birth of a child, what is marriage a proxy for?  It is certainly not a proxy for 
biology—our best guess about the identity of the child’s other genetic 
parent—as it was for married fathers.  Marriage seems to stand here as a 
proxy for consent of the definite legal parent—the biological mother—to 
share parental rights.  In defending its requirement of a formal legal tie as a 
prerequisite for parentage, the Debra H. court observed: “And both civil 
union and adoption require the biological or adoptive parent’s legal 
consent, as opposed to the indeterminate implied consent featured in the 
various tests proposed to establish de facto or functional parentage.”383  But 
consent to what?  Why is the decision to enter a marriage or civil union 
evidence of consent to share parentage of children conceived via artificial 
insemination or, at a minimum, with genetic material from a third party?  
The “implied consent” of de facto parentage may, indeed, be 
“indeterminate”; but it also speaks directly to the relevant question: did the 
biological mother intend to share her otherwise absolute parental rights 
with another adult? 
CONCLUSION 
There are no easy answers to questions of parentage in this or any 
number of other complicated contexts.  It is thus not entirely surprising that 
some courts have gravitated towards bright-line rules about who is, and 
                                                          
 381. Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2010).  
 382. For children conceived out of wedlock, the desire to ignore illegitimate, non-
marital sex meant that the law simply pretended they had no father. 
 383. Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 196. 
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who is not, a parent.  Certainty is a relevant value.  But it is not the only 
value.  This Article seeks to shed some light on the irony of returning to a 
regime that looks exclusively to marital status to determine parentage, 
when the trend in most other contexts has been decidedly in the other 
direction.  The question of why courts might have retreated in this way is 
no doubt complicated, but what made it possible is the different 
constitutional footing of unwed fathers, on the one hand, versus lesbian co-
parents, on the other.  States were simply stopped in their tracks at some 
point when they continued to insist that illegitimate children had no fathers.  
The beginnings of a trend towards non-marital childbearing and an 
increasingly strong view about the need for children to be supported by 
their parents rather than welfare money put pressure on this traditional 
approach to parentage, but the Supreme Court finished the job by elevating 
the rights of unwed fathers to constitutional status. 
For lesbian co-mothers, the social pressure towards recognition of 
multiple parents—a clear benefit to children—may be the same, but the 
constitutional pressure pushes in the opposite direction.  Not only do co-
parents not have the biological tie that gives rise to the protection for 
unwed fathers, but recognition of lesbian co-parents’ rights has the 
potential to infringe on the constitutionally protected parental rights of the 
biological or adoptive mother.384 
At the same time, however, it became possible for gays and lesbians to 
marry or enter marriage-equivalent statuses in a handful of states and 
foreign jurisdictions.  This provided courts an opportunity to provide 
greater recognition of co-parent rights—allowing parent-child ties to be 
established through blood, adoption, or marriage/civil union—while 
reigning in the more fluid and complicated doctrines that arise from a 
purely functional model of parentage.  This confluence of developments is 
pushing the law of parentage for children of gays and lesbians back through 
time rather than forward.  And while children of unmarried, same-sex 
parents are presumably protected against illegitimacy discrimination just 
like children of unmarried, opposite-sex parents, their illegitimacy may cost 
them something more important—a second legal parent. 
It may be that courts are at least indirectly using the marital status of 
lesbian couples as a proxy for consent to share parentage; that is, they 
assume that the biological mother who conceives—or even gives birth to—
children after entering into a formal legal relationship with a partner 
intends the partner to share parental rights and responsibilities.  But if this 
is the case, they are using a blunt instrument indeed.  The partner’s 
                                                          
 384. The degree to which the various doctrines regarding lesbian co-parentage 
successfully reconcile this tension is an important question, but not one fully resolved 
here. 
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functional role in parent-like activities over a period of time—particularly 
if the partner was involved in the decision to conceive a child in the first 
place—would seem a much better indicator of consent to share the role of 
parent than whether the couple said vows to each other at some point.  The 
de facto parentage doctrine is not a perfect solution.  It can be messy and 
provide no answer to the question of parentage without long, drawn-out 
litigation.  But, it provides a backstop at least to prevent one parent from 
unilaterally extinguishing a co-parent’s relationship with a child, possibly 
to the grave detriment of both the child and the co-parent.  Regardless of 
the mechanism, the question whether a child was born into a marriage 
should be kept separate from the question whether that child has two 
parents. 
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